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Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
rests on two now-familiar premises. First, for some statutes, the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation more readily yield a range of
plausible meanings than a single correct reading. Second, judges are not
always the officials best positioned to select one interpretation of a statute
from among the plausible options. Chevron relied on these premises to
decide that when a court finds ambiguity in a statute administered by an
agency, it must defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute, so long
as it is reasonable. But while administrative law provided a doctrinal
context for the Court's decision, Chevron's interpretive premises were
about statutes generally, not statutes administered by agencies.
Commentators eldom recognize the general nature of Chevron's
interpretive premises. This Article shines a spotlight on it by applying the
premises to a class of statutes outside administrative law. Judges, it
argues, are not the best-situated actors in our legal system to pick from
among the legally plausible readings of statutes that govern the conduct
of the general public. Indeed, they are not even the best-situated actors in
the courtroom. Juries possess epistemic and political qualities that make
them expert interpreters of conduct-regulating, generally-applicable
statutes. This Article invokes that expertise to propose "Chevron for
Juries," a series of procedural reforms that would transfer interpretive
primacy for this class of statutes to juries.
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INTRODUCTION
Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1
rests on two important premises about statutory interpretation: (i) for
1 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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many statutes, the traditional tools of interpretation more naturally
yield a range of permissible meanings than a single "best" reading, and
(ii) nonjudge interpreters sometimes possess epistemic and political
advantages over judges in selecting from among the legally plausible
options.2 Applying these premises to statutes governing the
administrative state, Chevron announced that judges must defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of certain ambiguous statutes. The
import of Chevron's premises, however, is not limited to statutes that
involve administrative agencies. Outside administrative law, just as
inside it, many statutes have a range of permissible meanings. And for
many statutes having nothing to do with agencies, judges may not be the
optimal interpreters. Given the general nature of the Court's premises,
one might have expected Chevron to prompt examination of other types
of statutes in search of superior nonjudge interpreters. But with few
exceptions, that examination has not come to pass, and Chevron's
interpretive premises have remained local to administrative law.3
This Article offers a partial remedy by applying Chevron's premises
to a class of statutes outside administrative law. My focus is on statutes
that govern the conduct of the general public. The Article's central claim
is that juries have epistemic and political advantages over judges in
choosing from among the permissible meanings of such statutes. Juries,
in other words, are to this class of statutes what agencies are to statutes
within Chevron's domain. I invoke the jury's epistemic and political
advantages to propose "Chevron for Juries," a series of procedural
reforms that would make juries the front-line interpreters of generally-
applicable, conduct-regulating statutes. Having relinquished
interpretive primacy over these statutes, judges in the Chevron for Juries
framework would police the outer boundaries of permissible statutory
meaning through procedural devices that mirror traditional Chevron
analysis.
This Article develops its proposal in three parts. Part I contains the
building blocks. It first defends the claim that Chevron rests on the
2 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 205-15 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power
to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2589-98 (2006); see also infra notes 15-34 and
accompanying text.
3 There are a few exceptions in the academic literature. Amanda Frost invoked Chevron-like
reasoning to propose that courts certify difficult statutory interpretation problems to Congress.
Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2007). A student note in
the Harvard Law Review likewise proposed Chevron-like deference to congressional resolutions.
Note, A Chevronfor the House and Senate: Deferring to Post-Enactment Congressional Resolutions
That Interpret Ambiguous Statutes, 124 HARV. L. REv. 1507 (2011). In a similar vein, Dan Kahan
relied on Chevron's interpretive premises to propose extending traditional Chevron deference to
Department of Justice interpretations of criminal statutes. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to
Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv. 469 (1996); see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007).
20151 1289
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
generalizable interpretive premises suggested above. Part I then
describes the mechanics of Chevron for Juries. The threshold
mechanical task is to specify the class of jury-eligible statutes. After
doing that, Part I identifies a set of modest procedural modifications
that would make Chevron for Juries operational. Part I concludes with
brief sections comparing Chevron for Juries to Chevron and placing the
proposal in historical context.
Part II makes the case for Chevron for Juries by arguing that juries
are better than judges at selecting from among the permissible meanings
of statutes that govern the conduct of the general public. It first suggests
that, for this class of statutes, juries are more epistemically capable than
judges. Because there is reason to be confident in the average juror's
ability to interpret these statutes, the Condorcet Jury Theorem offers
preliminary support. Stronger epistemic support comes from examining
the actual tasks required to do interpretation under the three major
modern approaches: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. For
statutes that govern the conduct of the general public, these tasks turn
out to be suited to the jury's strengths, or so I will argue.
Part II also argues that jury interpretations of conduct-regulating,
generally-applicable statutes have more political legitimacy than judicial
interpretations, for two reasons. First, juries are made up of cognitively
diverse jurors, and recent social science research indicates that diversity
is more valuable to problem solving than ability. Second, jury decisions
embody both majoritarian and deliberative democratic norms, while
judicial decisions lack a comparable source of political legitimacy.
Part III considers several objections to Chevron for Juries. First, it
tackles a series of related objections arising from the non-precedential
nature of jury decisions. Next, it confronts the claim of modern jury
critics that juries are biased and incompetent. Finally, it notes that while
Chevron for Juries has predictable distributional consequences, they are
likely minor.
I must make clear at the outset that I harbor no illusion that this
Article will prompt Congress or the courts to adopt Chevron for Juries.
The proposal is thus in the nature of a thought experiment, and its
payoffs are conceptual. One such payoff is the spotlight it shines on the
generality of Chevron's interpretive premises. A second, ultimately more
significant, conceptual payoff has to do with judicial power in a
democratic society. The lawmaking power of judges in interpreting the
1290 [Vol. 36:1287
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Constitution is well ventilated.4 So too is the "popular
constitutionalism" alternative.5 We pay less systematic attention to the
allocation of subconstitutional interpretive power to judges and-with
the notable exception of Chevron itself-almost none to possible
alternatives.6 But in order for our alocative choice in favor of judges to
count as reasoned, we must know something about the alternatives we
have implicitly rejected.7 Chevron for Juries offers that. It would
redistribute an important segment of the judiciary's current allotment of
subconstitutional lawmaking power. Evaluating its strengths and
weaknesses permits us to more fully assess our existing allocation of
subconstitutional authority.
I. BUILDING BLOCKS
A. Chevron: Doctrine and Theory
Chevron for Juries begins with Chevron, so we start with a doctrinal
pr&is. Chevron created a regime in which courts defer to agency
interpretations of certain regulatory statutes. As originally formulated,
Chevron is a "two-step" analysis.8 At step one, a court evaluates whether
Congress spoke directly to the question at hand. If it did, any agency
interpretation that deviates from Congress's direct statement is
impermissible. If the court can identify no clear statement, however, it
proceeds to step two, where it considers whether the agency's
interpretation is "reasonable," i.e., whether it is a plausible account of
statutory meaning.9 If so, the reviewing court defers to the agency's
interpretation.
Courts, in practice, and scholars, conceptually, have added a step
zero, where the reviewing court determines whether it will apply the
4 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1-33 (1962).
5 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 5-8 (2004); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2048-49 (2010).
6 That is, we lack a theory of popular subconstitutionalism, at least in statutory
interpretation. But see Martin H. Redish, Judge-Made Abstention and the Fashionable Art of
"Democracy Bashing," 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1024-26 (1990).
7 See Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[R]easoned decision-
making .... [requires] that the rejection of alternate theories or abandonment of alternate courses
of action be explained .... " (footnotes omitted)).
8 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2373 (2001) ("Chevron
prescribed a by now well known two-step inquiry.").
9 Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule have persuasively argued that Chevron's two
steps collapse into one. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
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Chevron framework at all.'0 In Chevron, the Court indicated that the
deference framework would apply to any statute that an agency
"administers."" The Court walked that back in United States v. Mead
Corp.,12 holding that deference is appropriate only if circumstances
indicate that Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to the
agency. 13
Because Chevron for Juries seeks to export Chevron-like reasoning
outside administrative law, the details of Chevron's doctrinal structure
are less important than its underlying logic. In (at least) two ways,
Chevron made important general points-i.e., points that are not local
to administrative law-about statutory interpretation. First, it
introduced the "zone of ambiguity" into the practice and theory of
statutory interpretation.4 Second, it offered a powerful example of how
interpretive doctrine can be sensitized to institutional considerations.
Both points must be unpacked.
1. Chevron and the Zone of Ambiguity
Chevron's deference regime rests on the premise that when a
statute is ambiguous, traditional legal tools are better at specifying a
range of reasonable meanings than a single best meaning. In Chevron
itself, the Court considered whether the term "stationary source" in the
Clean Air Act referred to a single polluting device or an entire plant.
President Reagan's EPA thought the latter. The Court looked to
traditional legal tools to sort out the statutory meaning. It found no
clarification, however, in the statute's text, explaining that the "terms are
overlapping" and could not "reveal an actual intent of Congress."15 The
legislative history of the Clean Air Act proved no more useful.16
Throwing up its hands, the Court declined to say which interpretation-
device or plant-it thought best, concluding instead that "the
Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation
of manifestly competing interests, and is entitled to deference."17 In this
move, the Court discarded, for cases in Chevron's domain, the long-
standing view that a court's job in statutory interpretation is to find the
10 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006); see also Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001).
11 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
12 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
13 VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 216-17; see also Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron
as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 688-89 (2007).
14 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 602.
15 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 861-62.
16 Id. at 862.
17 Id. at 862, 865 (agreeing with lower court that legislative history was "uniluminating").
1292 [Vol. 36:1287
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best meaning of a statute.'8 The Court replaced that traditional notion
with the "zone of ambiguity," i.e., the range of statutory readings that
are legally plausible in light of the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation. 19
That Chevron depends on the concept of a zone of ambiguity is not
a novel point.20 Less prominent in the literature, however, is that the
Court's conceptual move was not specific to administrative law.21 The
Clean Air Act's ambiguity did not exist in Chevron because of the EPA's
presence. It existed, rather, because the traditional legal tools that the
Court deployed did not lead to a single "best" reading of the Act. This is
a point about statutory interpretation generally, not about
administrative law. Statutes have zones of ambiguity because, as scholars
have known since at least 1950,22 the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation (plain meaning, canons, legislative history, etc.) often fail
to determine statutory meaning. The tools may reduce the zone's size-
e.g., they may allow us to conclude that a golf cart is subject to a ban on
"vehicles in the park" while a skateboard is not-but, in many cases,
they cannot condense it to a single point.23 This occurs in administrative
law cases, but there is nothing special, on this front, about statutes
administered by agencies.
2. Chevron's Institutional Logic
Chevron's legal justification remains a subject of debate in the
academy and the courts.24 On one side are those who justify Chevron on
the premise that Congress sometimes intentionally delegates
interpretive authority to agencies. On this view, Chevron deference is
appropriate only to the extent that Congress intended to delegate the job
of resolving a particular statutory ambiguity to an agency. This view is
18 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 690-91; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2598-602.
19 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 601.
20 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles
of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2005);
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 598-602.
21 But see Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 429 (2008) ("Although Chevron was concerned
with statutory implementation by administrative agencies, there is no good reason to think that
courts are not cast into the same policymaking role when Congress chooses them as its
delegates.").
22 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of
Cannons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
23 This example is borrowed, of course, from H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15 (1958).
24 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241-43 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gersen &
Vermeule, supra note 13, at 688 ("Chevron's theoretical rationale is unclear.").
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hard to derive from the Court's opinion in Chevron itself.25 In Mead,
however, Justice Souter's majority opinion appeared to embrace it.26
On the other side are those who believe that Chevron is best
justified by the institutional advantages that agencies possess over courts
in construing statutes within their policy domain. Justice Scalia took
such an approach in his Mead dissent. Chevron, Scalia argued, was based
on a "legal presumption" (i.e., a "legal fiction") that:
"When... Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute that is to be
administered by an executive agency, it is presumed that Congress
meant to give the agency discretion, within the limits of reasonable
interpretation, as to how the ambiguity is to be resolved."27 He
distinguished this legal fiction from the majority's approach, which
requires "specific congressional intent" to depart from the "background
rule" that statutory ambiguity should be resolved by judges.28
While the debate between those who emphasize delegation and
those who emphasize institutional capability is historically and
doctrinally important, we can bracket it here. This Article's claim-that
juries are superior interpreters of statutes that govern the conduct of the
general public-is necessarily institutional. It is no part of the claim that
existing legislation evidences an intent that juries resolve interpretive
questions.29 In other words, this Article addresses whether Chevron for
Juries is a good idea, leaving how it might be adopted for another day.
The institutional approach to Chevron helps answer this question; the
delegation approach does not.
Chevron identified two advantages that agencies hold over judges
in interpreting statutes that they administer: subject-matter expertise
and political accountability. Little need be said about the subject-matter
expertise of agencies. Judges are generalists who must be prepared to
rule on issues arising across the vast range of topics addressed by
25 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 689-90.
26 533 U.S. at 229-31. Many commentators argue that notwithstanding the Court's rhetoric of
actual intent to delegate, Mead in fact rests on a fictive theory of congressional delegation. See,
e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L.
REV. 2009 (2011).
27 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 243. Scalia's approach has supporters in the academy. See David J. Barron & Elena
Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 201, 205 ("[T]he Court's reliance
on congressional intent should give way to a frankly policy-laden assessment of the appropriate
allocation of power in the administrative state."); Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 689.
Returning to Chevron's text, Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule argue that the Court disclaimed
reliance on actual congressional intent to delegate. The basis for the decision, they contend, is
instead the comparative institutional evaluation in the Court's assertion that: "Judges are not
experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of Government." Gersen &
Vermeule, supra note 13, at 690 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29 At least legislation enacted in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries evidences no such
intent. But see infra Part I.D.
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statutes. Agency officials are specialists in the discrete policy spheres
implicated by the statutes they administer. They have both specialized
knowledge and the tools to acquire more.30 This expertise gives agencies
an obvious epistemic advantage over judges in interpreting ambiguous
regulatory statutes.
The political advantage of agencies over judges is less intuitive.
Justice Stevens addressed it at length:
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests,
but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In
contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to
the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for
this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute
in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the
agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a
gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case,
federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities
for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not
judicial ones.31
Justice Stevens makes two important points in this passage. First,
selecting an interpretation from the zone of ambiguity is necessarily a
policy-making exercise, which judges should avoid where possible.
Second, because of their greater accountability, agencies may, without
similar apprehension, make the policy choices left open by statutory
ambiguity. The principle driving both points is political legitimacy.
Judges "have no constituency."32 By virtue of their relationships with the
President, agencies do. 33 That distinction, on Chevron's logic, makes
agency interpretations within the zone of ambiguity more politically
legitimate than the interpretations of judges.
Chevron's institutional comparison of judges and agencies is
30 See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW 110-20 (2010).
31 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
32 Id. at 866.
33 Of course, not all agencies relate to the President in the same way. In Presidential
Administration, then-Professor Elena Kagan argued that independent agencies should receive less
deference than agencies fully within the executive branch. Kagan, supra note 8, at 2376-77.
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specific to administrative law. But its underlying premise-that for some
statutes, officials other than judges can be better interpreters than
judges-is general. By offering the possibility of superior nonjudge
statutory interpreters, Chevron prompts a question that extends far
beyond administrative law: for what class or classes of statutes can
nonjudges outperform judges?34 Chevron for Juries seeks to answer that
question for one particular class of statutes: those governing the conduct
of the general public.
B. Mechanics of Chevron for Juries
This Article turns next to the mechanics of Chevron for Juries. This
Section has straightforward goals: when a statute that governs the
conduct of the general public is at issue in litigation, I aim to make the
jury primarily responsible for interpreting it, while empowering judges
to police the outer boundaries of statutory meaning. This Section
sketches a plausible set of doctrinal modifications to achieve these goals.
There are likely other routes to the same destination. My claim is that
the reforms described here get there. Other routes may be more direct
or elegant.
The mechanics of Chevron for Juries can be easily summarized. A
court must first determine whether a statute is jury eligible. It is if it
announces a "conduct rule," as opposed to a "decision rule," and if it is
of general, rather than specialized, applicability. Once a statute is
deemed jury eligible, simple procedural reforms effectuate the
reassignment of interpretive leadership from judge to jury. First, when a
statute is jury eligible, the jury's instruction (on that issue) must be the
relevant statutory language, unadorned by clarifying or obfuscating
judicial guidance. Second, when a dispositive motion raises an
interpretive question regarding a jury-eligible statute, the court should
treat the interpretive question as it would treat a question of fact. Third,
courts must be able to prohibit lawyers from arguing for a statutory
interpretation outside the zone of ambiguity. Fourth, depending on
what interpretive methodology the jury is told to use, the rules of
evidence must be modified to allow the jury access to the tools it needs.
This Section unpacks these mechanics. To keep matters simple, this
Section (and the Article generally) assumes federal courts and federal
law.
34 Today, the "institutional turn" in statutory interpretation is well established. See
VERMEULE, supra note 2 at 64-85; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003); see also William N. Eskridge Jr., No Frills
Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2044-51 (2006) (reviewing VERMEULE, supra note 2)




1. Determining Jury Eligibility
In traditional Chevron, "step zero" is the stage of analysis at which
the court determines whether the Chevron framework applies. Chevron
for Juries has an analogue: jury eligibility. A statute is "jury eligible" in
Chevron for Juries if it contains a statutory conduct rule that is generally
applicable.
a. Conduct and Decision Rules Distinguished
First, the bottom line: a statute is jury eligible only if it contains a
conduct rule that does not substantively diverge from the relevant
decision rule. Statutes of this sort contain what this Article calls
"statutory conduct rules." This requires some explanation.
Legal rules can be divided into two classes: conduct rules and
decision rules. This distinction is borrowed from Meir Dan-Cohen.35
Though not original to him-Dan-Cohen traces it to Jeremy Bentham
and earlier-Dan-Cohen provides the definitive modern formulation.36
Conduct rules are "directed at the general public and provide[]
guidelines for conduct."37 Decision rules, by contrast, are directed at
"officials [who] make decisions with respect to members of the general
public.... and provide[] guidelines for their decisions."38 Both conduct
and decision rules contain sets of norms, but they are addressed to, and
binding on, different "norm-subjects."39
Bentham offered a simple example of the distinction.40 If a statute
provides "[1]et no man steal," and "[l]et the judge cause whoever is
convicted of stealing to be hanged," it contains both a conduct rule and
a decision rule.41 The first clause ("let no man steal") is a conduct rule
directed to the general public. The second clause tells an official, in this
case a judge, what to do when someone violates the conduct rule.
While conduct rules And decision rules are often substantively
identical, they need not be. Dan-Cohen's important thesis is that, to
achieve their normative ends, lawmakers sometimes create conduct
rules and decision rules that diverge on the same subject. For example, a
common conduct rule in criminal law (albeit not necessarily a statutory
one) is the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse." An equally
35 Meir Dan-,Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
36 Id. at 626 & n. 1.
37 Id. at 630.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 628.
40 JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (C. H. Wilson & R. B. McCallum eds., Basil




common decision rule for crimes with a "willfulness" mens rea
requirement is that "the Government must prove that the defendant
acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."42 Substantively,
the conduct rule and the decision rule are irreconcilable. Dan-Cohen's
point is that each serves an important normative function
(disincentivizing legal ignorance for the conduct rule; capturing moral
blameworthiness for the decision rule) and that achieving these
normative ends outweighs the disadvantages of logical inconsistency.
With the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules in
mind, we can further divide the statutory landscape into three kinds of
statutes. First, there is a class of statutes addressed only to officials and
containing only decision rules. This category probably makes up the
bulk of congressional output. It includes the countless statutes allocating
authority among governmental actors, prescribing rules of procedure
for courts, and directing officials to spend money.
The second category contains statutes addressed to officials and the
general public but, per Dan-Cohen, giving them different substantive
messages.
The third category also includes statutes that are addressed both to
officials and the general public but, unlike the second category, without
disagreement between the messages. Most substantive criminal law falls
into this category, owing to the prohibition on common law crimes.43
Where substantive rules of private law are codified, they often fall into
this category as well. Take, for example, the Uniform Commercial
Code's specification of a buyer's rights upon delivery of improper goods:
[I]f the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform
to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or (b) accept the
whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the
rest."4
The statute speaks both to members of the general public-telling
buyers what they may do when they receive bad goods-and to
officials-telling judges how to evaluate a buyer's reaction to such
goods.45
42 Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994).
43 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
44 U.C.C. § 2-601(1) (2013).
45 A fourth category of statutes can be safely disregarded. Although rare, some statutes
address only the general public. For instance, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct tell
lawyers (who are, for this purpose, the "general public") that: "A lawyer should aspire to render at
least [fifty] hours of pro bono publico legal services per year." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 6.1 (2013). This aspirational statute does not control any official decisionmaking. To the extent
it contains a "rule" at all, it contains a pure conduct rule.
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Only statutes in the third category are "jury eligible" in Chevron for
Juries. The portions of such statutes that announce conduct rules (e.g.,
"let no man steal") are what I mean by statutory conduct rules.
b. Statutes of General Applicability
The second prerequisite for jury eligibility is that the statutory
conduct rule be of general, rather than specialized, applicability.
"General applicability" here means that the statute governs (or
potentially could govern) an ordinary person. This requirement
excludes, for instance, statutes that presume scientific or other technical
knowledge, as well as statutes governing licensed professionals.46 For
reasons that will become clear below, the limitation exists to ensure that
a statute will be jury eligible only if its audience includes the general
public.
For some statutes, the general applicability determination will be
obvious. But not for all. Where general applicability is not obvious,
courts operating under Chevron for Juries will have to engage in limited
statutory interpretation. Consider, for instance, an anti-corruption
statute that could be read as applying only to public officials, or that,
alternatively, could be viewed as applying to everyone. In the Chevron
for Juries framework, a court would decide what class of people the
statute governs. If it found that the statute governs everyone, it would
leave to the jury the task of interpreting the statute's substantive anti-
corruption language.
2. Procedural Reforms
So far, this Article has examined how statutes will (or will not) be
deemed jury eligible. Next, it considers what happens upon an eligibility
determination. Importantly, nothing in the discussion that follows turns
on whether a case is civil or criminal. Chevron for Juries applies the
same way to both.47
46 Difficult line-drawing cases could arise about whether a statute presumes technical
knowledge. The Controlled Substances Act, for instance, refers to a great deal of chemistry. See
generally 21 U.S.C. § 802 (2012). Courts operating under Chevron for Juries would have to
determine whether those references make the Controlled Substances Act (or some portions of it)
not jury eligible. There is no obvious reason why courts could not do so, even in difficult cases.
47 In the text, this Article will focus on the procedural reforms necessary to effectuate Chevron
for Juries. Adoption of those reforms, however, would inevitably raise additional procedural
questions beyond that discussion. I note two here. First, should jurisdictions permit litigants to
probe potential jurors' legal views during voir dire? At least some probing seems appropriate. For
instance, in a jurisdiction that adopted an intentionalist "interpretation instruction," it seems
logical to permit litigants to identify potential jurors that take a strictly literal approach to
interpretation. More difficult problems would arise if litigants posed hypotheticals previewing the




The most important procedural reform of Chevron for Juries is that
juries will be instructed-as to the issue purportedly controlled by the
statute-with the unadorned text of the statutory conduct rule.
While this is a simple reform, it represents a significant shift from
current practice. Trial courts operationalize judicial statutory
interpretation through jury instructions. Consider the "honest services"
variant of mail fraud, which criminalizes scheming to defraud a person
out of his "intangible right of honest services."4s After the Supreme
Court ruled in Skilling v. United States49 that "honest services" fraud
encompasses only schemes involving kickbacks or bribes,5o the Ninth
Circuit promulgated a model jury instruction providing that an element
of honest services fraud is that "the scheme or plan consists of a [bribe
or kickback] in exchange for the defendant's services."51 Thus, in future
honest services cases in the Ninth Circuit-at least where the district
court uses the model instruction-jury verdicts will necessarily reflect
the Supreme Court's narrowing construction.
As Darryl Brown has explained, instructions that explain statutes
constrain the jury's interpretive discretion.52 Chevron for Juries does the
opposite. Under Chevron for Juries, jury instructions cannot conform
statutory language to judicial interpretations. In an honest services mail
fraud case, for example, the judge would give the jury the relevant text
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346, but could offer no opinion about what
those sections mean.53
Judges would, however, give a separate instruction explaining the
task of interpretation. The content of this "interpretation instruction"
will necessarily reflect a substantive theory of interpretation. Depending
disallowed. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. Second, when a judge adjudicates a legal
claim without a jury-either because the proceeding is in equity or because the parties have not
demanded a jury-should the legal system accord precedential status to statutory interpretations
within the decision? My view is that this question should be resolved by analogy to National Cable
& Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). In Brand X,
the Supreme Court ruled that if a court decides a question of statutory interpretation at Chevron
step one-i.e., if it decides that Congress spoke clearly to the question-its decision is binding on
agencies. Id. at 982-83. If the court decides the case at step two, however, agencies are free to
subsequently amend their interpretation. Id. Likewise, in Chevron for Juries, if a judge sitting
without a jury determines that only one reading of a statute is legally plausible, that decision
should be precedential. If the judge recognizes that she is picking from among plausible readings
of the statute, juries in future cases should be free to make their own selections.
48 18 U.S.C. § 1346; id. § 1341.
49 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
50 Id. at 405-11; see also Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 467-71 (2010).
51 NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.123 (2012), available at
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/582.
52 Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Instructions, Defendant Culpability, and Jury Interpretation of
Law, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 25 (2002).
53 In making their arguments, however, the lawyers would not be so constrained. In fact, the
lawyers would be expected to direct their interpretive arguments to the jury.
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on the legal system's judgment, the instruction might say: "When
interpreting a statute, your job is to identify and apply the literal
meaning of the words." Or, at the other extreme, it might say, "When
interpreting a statute, you must give effect to the subjective intentions of
the members of the legislative majority that enacted the statute."
The "interpretation instruction" has no analogue in current
interpretive practice, where judges are unconstrained in their choice of
methodology.54 Likewise, it is a departure from Chevron itself, as
agencies are also free to choose from a range of interpretive methods.
An interpretation instruction is necessary in Chevron for Juries,
however, because selecting an interpretive methodology does not
implicate a generally applicable conduct rule. That is, whether judges or
juries (or agencies) should construe statutes according to the tenets of
textualism, intentionalism, or something else poses a question of official
decisionmaking. This Article's claim is that juries are better equipped
than judges to interpret statutory conduct rules that govern ordinary
citizens. Nothing in the structure of that claim, however, suggests that
juries are in a superior position to choose among models of official
decisionmaking. As such, judges should choose a methodology and
instruct the jury on it.s5
b. Dispositive Motions
When a jury is instructed with the language of statutory conduct
rules, its verdict will reflect its interpretation of those rules. This reform
will be for naught in cases where a judge does not permit the jury to
return a verdict, or where a judge countermands a verdict already
rendered. A modification to the law governing dispositive motions is
required.
American procedural law contains a number of mechanisms that
take a case, or an issue in a case, away from the jury, including motions
to dismiss,56 motions for summary judgment,57 motions for judgment as
a matter of law,5S and, in criminal cases, motions for judgment of
acquittal.59 While these dispositive motions vary in what facts the judge
may consider,60 they share two important features. First, for each type of
54 Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872-77 (2008).
55 This Article returns to the interpretation instruction below. See infra notes 94-100 and
accompanying text.
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v).
57 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
58 FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
60 When the motion is made on the pleadings, the judge takes the well-pleaded facts as true.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). When it is made after trial, as in a criminal motion for
judgment of acquittal or a posttrial civil motion for judgment as a matter of law, the judge
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motion, after determining the applicable facts, the judge evaluates
whether those facts permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving
party. Second, to the extent disputed points of law-including disputed
questions of statutory interpretation-are raised in dispositive motions,
the judge may adjudicate them. In resolving legal disputes, however, the
judge asks which side is actually right, not whether a reasonable jury
could find for the nonmoving party.
The second feature common to dispositive motions renders the
instructional change described above hollow. If a judge determines the
"correct" interpretation of a jury-eligible statute on a dispositive motion,
she makes the jury irrelevant. For juries to take the interpretive lead,
judges ruling on dispositive motions must treat jury-eligible interpretive
questions as they treat facts. Thus, rather than asking which
interpretation is correct, the judge in a Chevron for Juries case would
decide whether a reasonable jury could embrace the interpretation
proposed by the nonmoving party. Dispositive motions raising disputed
points about jury-eligible statutes could still be granted, but only if the
moving party demonstrates that his opponent's interpretation is outside
the zone of ambiguity. The judge thus retains a role in statutory
interpretation-specifically, she retains the power to police the zone of
ambiguity-while the jury's primacy is maintained.
c. Interpretive Motions in Limine
While dispositive motion practice will permit judges to monitor
the outer bounds of reasonableness, it is an incomplete tool. Consider
an implausible interpretation pressed by a criminal defendant. For
instance, perhaps a defendant wishes to defend a charge of driving a
vehicle in the park on the theory that his Jeep is not a vehicle. No
dispositive motion is available to criminal prosecutors, so the prosecutor
cannot dispense with the defendant's nonsensical argument. Dispositive
motions practice in civil cases likewise has holes that would prevent
judges from keeping some unreasonable statutory arguments away from
juries.61
A second mechanism is thus necessary to ensure that only
interpretations within the zone of ambiguity are presented to the jury. A
form of motion in limine can serve this function: "[t]he purpose of an in
limine motion is to aid the trial process by enabling the Court to rule in
advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence."62 While
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
61 This is because courts generally cannot grant dispositive motions that involve genuinely
disputed questions of fact. When an issue simultaneously implicates a disputed factual question
and a disputed point of statutory interpretation, a dispositive motion is not an effective tool for
keeping unreasonable statutory interpretations away from the jury.
62 Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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most commonly invoked to bar inadmissible evidence, in limine
motions can also be used to block impermissible arguments, as when
prosecutors move to exclude arguments for jury nullification.63 In
limine motions could likewise be used, in the Chevron for Juries
framework, to exclude anticipated arguments for unreasonable statutory
interpretations. Thus, in a Chevron for Juries case, the criminal
prosecutor described above could move in limine to prevent the defense
from arguing that a Jeep is not a kind of vehicle.
d. Sources of Evidence
If they are to interpret statutes, juries will need access to evidence
of statutory meaning. As noted, jury instructions will contain the
statutes themselves. Most interpretive methodologies, however, do not
stop with statutory text. All forms of intentionalism and purposivism,
and even some forms of textualism,64 recognize extrinsic evidence of
meaning in certain circumstances. Most importantly, for the purposes
of this Article, they recognize legislative history. Unless a jurisdiction
adopts a narrowly textual interpretation instruction, Chevron for Juries
thus entails some modification to the rules of evidence to allow litigants
to present legislative history to the jury.
How much and what kind of legislative history juries should
consider depends on the details of a jurisdiction's interpretive
methodology, but a few general comments are possible. Regardless of a
jurisdiction's theory of statutory meaning, some limitations on
legislative history will be necessary. No sensible rule, for instance, would
permit litigants to subpoena legislators for testimony. It will probably be
necessary to develop explicit rules specifying what forms of legislative
history are permitted. Further rules could specify threshold showings
that litigants must make before offering evidence of legislative history.65
Such rules in themselves may constitute an improvement on the
haphazard fashion in which judges often use legislative history in the
current interpretive regime.66
As with many evidentiary choices, moreover, courts will have to
trade the cost of legislative history against its probity. The probity of
legislative history, however, is not fixed. Rather, legislative history has
63 United States v. Thompson, No. 99-41007, 2001 WL 498430, at *16 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2001).
64 See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Legislative
history may be invaluable in revealing the setting of the enactment and the assumptions its
authors entertained about how their words would be understood.").
65 This could take a similar form to judicial determinations of expert qualification under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
66 See Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified
Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) ("[I]n each case the Justices have engaged in




more relevance on some theories of interpretation than others.
Jurisdictions adopting legislative history-intensive approaches to
interpretation must be willing to bear more evidentiary costs than
jurisdictions adopting text-intensive approaches. Notably, the same is
true in the current system. That is, when judges use legislative history-
intensive approaches, they impose costs on themselves and others.67 The
difference is that Chevron for Juries makes these costs explicit,
permitting open discussion of whether they are worth incurring.
C. Chevron and Chevron for Juries
At this point, the reader may wish to know what the Chevron for
Juries structure described above has to do with Chevron. They are linked
in at least three respects.
First, as noted, Chevron's opening premise is that traditional legal
tools are often better at identifying a range of permissible statutory
meanings than a single "best" meaning.68 Chevron for Juries begins from
the same premise. In Chevron for Juries, judges are relieved of the duty
of-finding the "best" reading of jury-eligible statutes. When deciding
dispositive motions and motions in limine, courts will instead use
traditional legal tools to evaluate whether an interpretation proposed by
a party is reasonable. Chevron and Chevron for Juries thus share a
"range," as distinguished from a "point," approach to judicial
interpretation.69 A very preliminary justification for adopting Chevron
for Juries is that it achieves a measure of intellectual consistency
between the interpretation of administrative statutes and the
interpretation of conduct-regulating statutes of general applicability.
Second, both Chevron and Chevron for Juries are deference
regimes, in that both call for judges to defer to the reasonable
interpretations of others. To be sure, the chronology of the
reasonableness check differs between the two regimes. In traditional
Chevron, courts check for reasonableness after the agency
interpretation, when an adversely impacted party seeks judicial review.
In Chevron for Juries, judges ensure reasonableness before the jury
interpretation, through resolution of dispositive motions and motions
in limine. Thus, traditional Chevron deploys deference ex post while
Chevron for Juries deploys it ex ante. Both regimes, however, combine a
judicial check on reasonableness with deference to nonjudge
interpreters.
67 VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 192-97.
68 See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
69 See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1046 (2011) (utilizing point/range terminology to describe the Chevron framework).
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Third, Chevron and Chevron for Juries both find normative
justification in comparing the institutional capabilities of judges to the
institutional capabilities of other officials. This Article turns to that
institutional analysis of juries shortly.
I should not, however, overstate the analogy. There are clear
differences between deference to administrative agencies and the
deference to juries proposed in this Article. Several will be discussed
below. Most importantly, juries, unlike agencies, cannot announce
binding prospective rules. Because agencies can clarify statutory
ambiguities for the entire nation, a feat that only the Supreme Court can
accomplish in the Article III setting, Chevron is sometimes celebrated
for its ability to foster legal certainty.70 Chevron for Juries, on the other
hand, renders courts unable to resolve statutory ambiguities except on
the margins, a reform that tends to reduce certainty. This Article returns
to the question of certainty below.71 While acknowledging it as a cost of
the proposal, I will suggest that Chevron for Juries does not detract from
legal certainty as much as one might initially suppose. At this point, it
suffices to note the departure from Chevron.
D. Chevron for Juries and the Historical Role of the Jury
Before turning to substantive arguments for Chevron for Juries, one
final introductory note is in order. Chevron for Juries may strike the
reader as a stark departure from current practice. "Statutory
interpretation," Lawrence Solan notes, "is traditionally seen as the
business of the court."72 The proposal, however, is less novel than it first
appears. Statutory interpretation has not always belonged exclusively to
judges. In the colonial period and into the nineteenth century, juries
decided questions of fact and law. A brief foray into this history may
ease concerns about the break from current interpretive practices.
The jury's control over law in the colonial era and immediately
after the Revolution is well documented.73 English juries of the
70 E.g., Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121
(1987) ("By removing the responsibility for precision from the courts of appeals, the Chevron rule
subdues this diversity, and thus enhances the probability of uniform national administration of
the laws.").
71 See infra Part III.A.
72 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
199 (2010).
73 See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 587
(1939) (noting that in congressional debate on the Sedition Law of 1798, "[n]either [side]
questioned expressly the propriety of allowing the jury to determine the ultimate legal question of
the substantive meaning of the statute"); see also Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief
History of Criminal Jury in United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 902-20 (1994); Matthew P.
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eighteenth century lacked de jure authority to decide questions of law.74
A different practice emerged in the colonies.75 In the years leading up to
the American Revolution, the jury's law-finding power came to
symbolize resistance to British rule. Indeed, British statutes curtailing
the power of American juries were among the causes of the Revolution.
The Continental Congress complained in the Declaration of
Independence that George III had combined with Parliament to deny
colonists "in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury."76
The law-finding function of American juries persisted in the
immediate aftermath of the Revolution. In the early federal trial courts,
judges offered their opinion of the law to the jury, but the jury had the
prerogative to reject their views.77 Over the course of the nineteenth
century, however, the jury's law-finding authority came under attack,
and was, eventually, discarded.78 The change took hold first in civil
cases. Judges developed procedural devices, such as new trials and
special verdicts, to limit jury law-finding.79 By the 1820s and 1830s,
judges more straightforwardly denied that juries have a law-finding role
in civil cases. The evolution was slower in criminal cases. As late as
1851, nine states still had statutory or constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the law-finding power of criminal juries.80 After 1850,
however, the tide turned decisively in favor of judges.81 In 1895, the
Supreme Court settled the matter for purposes of the federal courts,
Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 377; Jenia
Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 324 (2003); Stanton D.
Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111 (1998); Jonathan Lahn, The Demise of the Law-Finding Jury in
America and the Birth of American Legal Science: History and its Challenge for Contemporary
Society, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 553 (2009); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes
from an Underappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993); Note, The Changing Role of the
Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
74 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 73, at 903.
75 By the 1734 trial of Peter Zenger for defaming the royal governor of New York, the jury's
authority over law had developed to the point that Zenger's defense counsel could assert: "I know
[that the jury] ha[s] the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law and fact, and where
they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so." Harrington, supra note 73, at 393. Zenger was
acquitted.
76 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 1776).
77 Harrington, supra note 73, at 401. In Georgia v. Brailsford, a jury trial conducted by the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Jay instructed the jury that while "on questions of law, it is the
province of the court to decide," the jury nonetheless possessed a right "to determine the law as
well as the fact in controversy." 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 1 (1794).
78 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 73, at 906-11; Harrington, supra note 73, at 405-15.
79 Iontcheva, supra note 73, at 324.




declaring in an opinion by Justice Harlan that absent contrary statutory
direction, jurors are bound by the legal instructions of trial judges.82
There are several dimensions to the rejection of law-finding juries
in the nineteenth century. The story is partly economic, as commercial
interests in the early Republic feared the uncertainty of jury
determinations of law.83 It is partly about the institutional interests of
judges.84 And it is partly about the increased complexity and
sophistication of American legal practice after the Revolution.85 In an
important sense, though, the rejection of the law-finding jury mirrored
an ideological shift in American jurisprudence. The law-finding jury of
the eighteenth century reflected a natural law orientation.86 But the
nineteenth century saw a turn away from natural law and toward "law as
a set of positive rules leading to predictable results."87 The plenary
power of juries over law was inconsistent with that idea of law. As one
commentator put the point: "[t]he concept of a natural law accessible to
the common man was alien to lawyers and judges who distrusted the
common man."88 The demise of the jury's law-finding function thus in
part reflects the larger shift from natural law to mechanical legal
science.89
Mechanical legal science, however, has not survived in statutory
interpretation, as discussed below.90 Our practice of statutory
interpretation as the exclusive (outside administrative law) realm of
judges is thus based on a discarded jurisprudential theory. Just as the
tradition of plenary jury law-finding did not survive the evolution from
naturalism to mechanical legal science, the tradition of plenary judge
statutory interpretation need not survive the demise of mechanical legal
science.
To be clear, this Article's argument is not originalist. I do not claim
that the founding-era history mandates assigning a lead role in statutory
interpretation (for any class of statutes) to juries. The history does,
however, evidence that such a role for juries is consistent with our
82 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-07 (1895). As Harrington notes, at least three state
constitutions still authorize juries to determine the law, but "judicial opinions have rendered these
provisions a nullity." Harrington, supra note 73, at 432-33 n.260.
83 Harrington, supra note 73, at 397.
84 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 73, at 916-17 (citing "members of the Critical Legal Studies
movement, public choice theorists, and Marxists").
85 Id.
86 As a 1964 Yale Law Journal note explains, "[slince natural law was thought to be accessible
to the ordinary man, the theory invited each juror to inquire for himself whether a particular rule
was consonant with principles of higher law." Note, supra note 73, at 172.
87 Id. at 192.
88 Id.
89 See Lahn, supra note 73, at 567-72.
90 See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
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constitutional structure. If the substantive arguments for Chevron for
Juries succeed, there is room for Congress or the courts to adopt it.
II. ARGUMENTS
In Chevron, the Supreme Court recognized that officials working at
administrative agencies are better than judges at interpreting certain
statutes.91 Chevron for Juries is justified on the same kind of logic. Just
as administrative agencies are epistemically and politically more capable
than judges at interpreting regulatory statutes, juries are epistemically
and politically better than judges at interpreting statutes that govern the
conduct of the general public. Those advantages provide the central
justification for Chevron for Juries.
A. Epistemic Legitimacy
Chevron assigns primary responsibility for interpreting regulatory
statutes to agencies in part because of the subject-matter expertise of
agency officials. This Section argues that juries are likewise subject-
matter experts on statutes that govern the conduct of the general public,
and thus that jury interpretations of these statutes are more likely to be
accurate than judicial interpretations. To be sure, the technical and
scientific "expertise" of agency officials differs from the kind of
"expertise" juries possess. Agency officials are experts because of their
training and professional experience in the subject-matter that they
regulate. The jury's expertise, by contrast, emanates from its structure,
not from any subject-specific training or experience.
This Section advances its epistemic claim via two approaches. The
first is based on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which provides plausible,
but ultimately tentative, support.92 For more robust support, the second
approach examines the jury's institutional advantages vis-h-vis judges in
completing the tasks required by the three leading schools of statutory
interpretation.93 Before developing these approaches, however, I must
address what "accuracy" means in the context of statutory
interpretation.
91 See supra Part I.A.2.
92 See infra Part II.A.2.
93 See infra Part II.A.3.
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1. "Accuracy" in Statutory Interpretation
It is unclear whether a court's interpretation of a statute can today
be described as "accurate." Accuracy talk presupposes an external rubric
against which a proposition can be verified or falsified. Statutory
interpretation, however, has proven resilient to external rubrics. Despite
a vigorous academic debate, especially during the last twenty years, no
consensus has emerged about the goal of statutory interpretation.94
Consider the statutory methodologies found in the U.S. Reports. In
one opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, the Court appears committed to
the notion that the goal of statutory interpretation is to recover the
ordinary meaning of the statutory text.95 In another opinion, authored
by Justice Breyer, the Court's apparent goal is to ascertain and apply the
statute's purposes.96 In yet another opinion, penned by Justice Stevens,
the Court inquires into the subjective intentions of the statute's
authors.97 Critically, the Court does not consider itself or lower courts
bound by methodology.98 Each judge is thus free to apply her
interpretive goal of choice, and each opinion sets its own standard of
interpretative success. The lack of consensus among judges over
interpretive goals means that there is no external way to evaluate
whether any particular interpretation was "accurate."
Chevron for Juries permits meaningful talk of interpretative
accuracy. As described in Part I, judges in a Chevron for Juries
framework will give juries a general instruction explaining the task of
interpretation. In the early days of Chevron for Juries, if the legislature
has not imposed an interpretive goal, lower-court judges may disagree
about what the instruction should say. Textualist-minded judges will
instruct juries in accord with the principles of textualism, purposivists
with the principles of purposivism, and so on. Eventually these cases-
with their divergent instructions-will reach the appellate courts. But
instead of dressing for a substantive result, interpretive methodology
will arrive as the issue for decision. Once the top appellate court has
94 At least not in federal court. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750,
1765 (2010) ("Indeed, the Court does not give stare decisis effect to any statements of statutory
interpretation methodology." (emphasis added)). Gluck's survey of state courts, however, suggests
that some states have succeeded in subjecting interpretive methodology to the rule of stare decisis.
Id. at 1771-75.
95 E.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991).
96 E.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 513-15 (1996).
97 E.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 529-30 (1983) ("But before we hold that the statute is as broad as its words suggest, we must
consider whether Congress intended such an open-ended meaning.").
98 See Foster, supra note 54, at 1873-75; see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of
Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2144-45 (2002) ("[Tlhe Justices do not seem to
treat methodology as part of the holding. .. ").
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spoken, statutory interpretations will be "accurate" to the extent that
they achieve the goals articulated by that court, and "inaccurate" to the
extent they depart. A preliminary advantage of Chevron for Juries is that
it permits meaningful discussion of interpretive accuracy.
To say that courts have been unable to agree on the goal of
interpretation, however, does not mean that such consensus is
impossible.99 For purposes of comparing the institutional capacities of
judges and jurors, this Article assumes that Congress or the Supreme
Court could impose a binding theory of statutory meaning, thus
providing a framework by which to evaluate the accuracy of judicial
statutory interpretation. The (epistemic) question for Chevron for Juries
becomes whether judges or juries are more capable of accurately
interpreting statutes that govern the conduct of the general public
according to the methods and goals of a specified approach.
This is, of course, an empirical question. The best answer would be
based in falsifiable empirical research comparing the accuracy rates of
judges and juries. Such research does not appear to exist. Although jury
scholars have extensively studied how juries decide fact questions and
apply instructions generally, there is very little data on statutory
interpretation by juries. 100
Notwithstanding the lack of data, reasonable inferences can be
made from known properties of the institutions. The next two Sections
seek to get at the epistemic comparison of judges and juries in two ways.
The first, which is agnostic to theories of statutory meaning, invokes the
numerosity of juries to apply the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The second
relaxes the theory agnosticism slightly to consider the jury's institutional
characteristics as applied to the three most prominent modern
interpretive schools: textualism, purposivism, and intentionalism.
99 See Foster, supra note 54, at 1865-70.
100 See Brown, supra note 52, at 38-39 nn.43-45 (collecting sources on research into jury's
ability to apply instructions). Professor Brown is an exception. See Darryl K. Brown, Plain
Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal
Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1998). He examined videotaped jury deliberations from an actual
criminal case. Id. at 1239-49. The defendant, a man of "substantially sub-average intelligence,-
was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at 1239 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The trial evidence revealed unambiguously that the defendant was a felon and that he
possessed a gun, ostensibly all the facts necessary for conviction. The jury nonetheless acquitted.
Brown explained that the jurors seized on the statutory requirement (incorporated into their
instructions) that the defendant "knowingly" possessed the gun. They resisted a literal
construction of "knowingly," reasoning that a man of the defendant's intelligence did not "know"
of his possession in the way an ordinary person would. Brown found that the reasoning deployed
by the jurors was substantially similar to that found in judicial statutory interpretation,
particularly of the non-textualist vein. Id. at 1250-54; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Jurors as




2. The Jury Theorem
The epistemic version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem provides
that when a group considers a question with a right answer and a wrong
one, the group's collective judgment will exceed that of its individual
members so long as (i) the average member of the group has a better-
than-random chance of getting the right answer, and (ii) voting is
statistically independent and abides majority rule.10 One important
implication of the Theorem is that "a large enough number of fairly
poor (but better than random) guessers can easily prove more
competent than a small panel of highly competent experts."102
Supermajority voting requirements speed the rate at which juries
converge on right answers, provided that they do not preclude decision
altogether. 103
It would strain credulity to suggest that the average juror's capacity
for statutory interpretation exceeds that of the average judge. But if jury
interpretations of conduct-regulating statutes of general applicability
satisfy the Theorem's empirical conditions, we nonetheless have a basis
on which to prefer juries to judges. There are two potential problems:
the assumption of statistical independence of votes and the assumption
of voter competence.104 Because jury statutory interpretation has not
been subjected to empirical study, there is no basis to firmly conclude
that these assumptions hold. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe
that they might.
The first hurdle is the requirement that Condorcetian jurors vote
independently. Actual jury decisions are the product of deliberation, not
101 Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 4-5
(2009).
102 Id. at 5; see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1462 (2011) ("[A] group of lay jurors who decide by majority rule can
arrive at the correct answer more often than can a single expert.").
103 Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 743-44 (2001). It is not
the case, however, that unanimous or supermajority voting requirements always enhance group
judgment. When group choice is structured such that a unanimous vote is required for one course
of action, but not for its alternative, such requirements can detract from group judgment. In that
setting, these voting rules tend to reduce the chance that any particular voter will be necessary to
the outcome. That may prompt voters to (1) vote strategically, and/or (2) fail to optimally invest
in information gathering. See Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pe~endorfer, Convicting the
Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts Under Strategic Voting, 92 AM. PO. SC.
REV. 23 (1998); Stephenson, supra note 102, at 1468-71. Trial juries, however, require a
supermajority vote to find for either side. In that circumstance, each voter is necessary to every
decision-provided that a decision is actually made-and the strategic voting and information
gathering problems are avoided. See generally Peter J. Coughlan, In Defense of Unanimous Jury
Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting, 94 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 375 (2000).
104 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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the silent aggregation of votes.105 Although deliberation poses a
challenge to voter independence, it does not, without more, defeat it. 106
In fact, by increasing the information available to jurors, deliberation
can enhance group accuracy on Condorcetian terms. 107 A more difficult
problem arises if, in addition to deliberating, jurors defer to opinion
leaders within the jury. Deference, however, is not necessarily fatal to
the Jury Theorem either. 108 Moderate deference, especially to jurors with
real expertise, can even bolster Condorcetian logic. 109
Whether jurors would delegate-i.e., defer strongly-their
interpretive votes to other jurors is obviously an empirical question. But
there is no a priori reason to believe that jury dynamics in this regard
would differ materially from jury dynamics in the factfinding domain.
The empirical findings from a study of jury factfinding lends some-
albeit not conclusive-support to the proposition that jurors do not
abdicate their votes. In a mock jury experiment, Shari Diamond and
Jonathan Casper polled jurors, prior to deliberation, about their
preferred damages verdict.1i0 They found that predeliberation verdicts
of jury forepersons correlated more strongly to postdeliberation verdicts
than predeliberation verdicts of all jurors. Importantly, however, the
correlation of forepersons was 0.44, compared to a correlation of 0.22
for all jurors. This suggests that while forepersons have substantial
influence, it may not be overwhelming. While the dynamics of
deliberation likely detract from a pure Condorcetian logic, this data
does appear to show some independence.
Moreover, Diamond and Casper also found that when a juror had
an expertise useful to the subject being deliberated-specifically, when a
juror in a statistically complex antitrust case had taken a statistics
course-the juror was both more likely to be selected as foreperson and
105 Social science research from the factfinding context shows that deliberation does impact
jury outcomes. Iontcheva, supra note 73, at 347-48.
106 Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1595 (2007) ("The
Theorem requires that independent votes cannot be predicted just by knowing how some other
vote was cast, but voters can deliberate together and influence each others' views without
undermining the Theorem's logic."); see also David M. Estlund, Opinion Leaders, Independence,
and Condorcet's Jury Theorem, 36 THEORY & DECISION 131, 131-32, 148-49 (1994). But see Jason
M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1362 (2012) ("But of
course, the jurors' final votes are not at all independent, having been reached after discussion with
one another.").
107 David M. Estlund et al., Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau
Revisited, 83 AM. POL. SC. REV. 1317, 1327-28 (1989) (Waldron section).
108 Id.; see also Vermeule, supra note 106, at 1608-09.
109 Vermeule, supra note 106, at 1609 ("A small number of (effectively independent) voters of
very high average competence can do better than a large number of voters of lower average
competence.").
110 Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 513, 544-48 (1992).
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more likely to be influential in that role.II' This suggests that jurors may
defer based on expertise, potentially increasing the accuracy of their
outcomes. It does not, of course, prove it, as the dynamic could be the
result of an information cascade rather than moderate deference to
expertise. 112 While more empirical data is needed to determine whether
jury dynamics comport with the independence condition of the Jury
Theorem, it seems plausible that they do.
The second Jury Theorem hurdle requires that the average juror's
competence exceed that of a random guesser. That level of competence
is required for the Jury Theorem to apply at all. Because judges are
concededly experts at statutory interpretation, moreover, preferring
juries requires more than formal compliance with the Jury Theorem's
requirements. The Jury Theorem predicts that juries will reach the
correct answer more quickly-i.e., with fewer voters-as average
competency rises. Thus, Saul Levmore notes that if a jury of twelve
barely competent members is required to render its verdict with nine
votes, the chance of a correct verdict is only fifty-seven percent. But if
individual members get the right answer six times out of ten, group
accuracy shoots to ninety-four percent."3 For the Jury Theorem to
plausibly lead to a preference for juries over judges, jurors must bring
more than the bare minimum of interpretive competence to the jury
room.
In one sense, whether they do is another empirical question.114
Below, this Article will consider whether the jury's skills match the
requirements of leading interpretative theories. Even in the abstract,
however, there is good reason to think that, as to many statutes that are
jury eligible in Chevron for Juries, jurors possess the requisite capacity
for a strong application of the Jury Theorem.
Statutes are jury eligible only if they directly regulate the conduct of
ordinary people, i.e., the sort of people that populate juries. The void-
for-vagueness doctrine, an aspect of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, requires that many of these statutes be
comprehensible to ordinary people. The doctrine ensures that statutory
111 Id. at 552-53.
112 See Stephenson, supra note 102, at 1475 (describing information cascades, also known as
herding).
113 See Levmore, supra note 103, at 735 n.23. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that
Chevron for Juries would entail relaxing jury unanimity rules. Levmore's numbers merely provide
a mathematical point of reference. Moreover, as he notes, because real juries deliberate and may
sometimes compromise, the numbers must be taken with a grain of salt. Id. ("In reality, when
supermajority or unanimity rules are in place, and especially when they are symmetrical as
between the parties, the voters are encouraged to deliberate and to reach a verdict.").
114 Actually it is two questions. First, what is the interpretive capability of juries? Second, what
is the interpretive capability of judges?
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readers receive "fair notice" of what is and what is not legally
permissible. 115
"Fair notice" can be conceptualized as requiring a minimum
probability that an ordinary person, given the opportunity to consider
relevant sources of statutory meaning, will accurately apply a statute to a
particular fact setting.16 So understood, juror competence becomes a
kind of existence condition for many statutes that govern the conduct of
the general public. For present purposes, it is not important to precisely
fix the constitutionally required probability. "7 At a minimum, it seems
obvious that if the probability does not exceed fifty percent, the statute
does not give fair notice. That intuitive minimal probability is all that is
needed to say that a weak form of voter competency affixes to these
statutes.
It does not seem much of a stretch, moreover, to posit that the
constitutionally required probability threshold meaningfully exceeds
fifty percent. Only a slight increase is needed for a stronger form of Jury
Theorem to hold, as Levmore's numbers show. In the context of
criminal statutes especially, it is reasonable to believe that due process
requires at least a sixty percent chance that an ordinary person can
determine whether a particular action violates a prohibition. Such a
probability threshold lends significant credence to a strong version of
the Jury Theorem.118
115 Dan-Cohen, supra note 35, at 658-64; see also United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 333
(8th Cir. 2011) (noting that the doctrine "protects persons by providing 'fair notice' of a statute's
applicability and by preventing 'arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions' of a statute's
enforcement" (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010))), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
107 (2012).
116 The "fair notice" rationale underlying the vagueness doctrine has been attacked on the
grounds that, in a world in which people do not actually consult statutes to plan conduct, it is
"entirely formal." John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 207 (1985). But, as Paul Robinson points out, the hallmark of fair
notice is not actual notice, but the opportunity for it. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair
Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 364 (2005) ("Fairness requires that an
actor have at least an opportunity to find out what the criminal law prohibits."). So conceived,
"fair notice" justifies the vagueness doctrine. When statutory language is so indeterminate that a
reasonable person cannot get at its true meaning, no opportunity for notice exists. Such an
opportunity does, by contrast, exist when clear statutory language goes unread.
117 Although the vagueness prohibition is strongest in the criminal context, it applies to some
civil statutes as well. In A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., the Court indicated that
the doctrine applies to statutory questions of private law:
It was not the criminal penalty that was held invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a
rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite as to really be no rule or standard at
all. Any other means of exaction, such as declaring the transaction unlawful or
stripping a participant of his rights under it, was equally within the principle of those
cases.
267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
118 A third Jury Theorem hurdle arises from the collective action problem nested in the
Theorem's logic. See Stephenson, supra note 102, at 1464-68. As Stephenson notes, the
Condorcetian framework "assumes that each agent gets some 'signal' of the correct answer to the
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3. Juries and the Major Models of Interpretation
Pure Condorcetian logic lends tentative support to Chevron for
Juries. For stronger support, we must more closely examine the
particular institutional capabilities of judges and juries. This
examination begins with the old saw that judges decide the law and
juries decide the facts. Because statutory interpretation is conventionally
viewed as "law,"119 it poses a seeming obstacle to the claim that juries
could be superior interpreters of any statutes. I must deal with this
obstacle before proceeding further.
It is an open question in legal theory whether law and fact are
ontologically, logically, or even analytically distinct. Ronald Allen and
Michael Pardo have argued that they are not. 120 On their account, law is
a species within the larger genus of fact. If Allen and Pardo are right,
then the law-fact obstacle to Chevron for Juries is easily set aside. So we
assume that Allen and Pardo are wrong, and that law and fact really are
different.
Doctrinally, the division of "questions of law" from "questions of
fact" is messy, even incoherent. 121 Consider negligence determinations.
To the uninitiated, the determination of whether a given set of facts fits
within the rubric of legal negligence would seem straightforwardly a
question of law. Yet "it is a firmly entrenched rule that juries shall
decide both the underlying facts and whether those facts constitute
negligence." 122 What gives?
Henry Monaghan has shown that the incoherence of the law-fact
distinction stems from a failure to recognize that the binary categories
of law and fact actually describe three functions: "law declaration, fact
identification, and law application."123 Two of the functions categorize
easily: law declaration involves questions of law and fact identification
questions of fact. Law application, however, does not fit neatly into
question at issue." Id. at 1465. If a costly investigation is required to obtain a quality signal, then
"the more agents that are involved.., the stronger is the incentive to free ride." Id. Thus, if the
signal is expensive and there are a large number of agents, the group is likely to underinvest in
information acquisition. Id. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that trial juries are significantly
impacted by this collective action problem. The cost of obtaining quality signals in the trial setting
derives from attending to the evidence and arguments of the parties. Courts compel juror
attendance at trial, thus relieving jurors of the decision whether to expend resources on signal
gathering. They arrive at the jury room having been forced to engage in the costly information
acquisition necessary to obtain good signals.
119 See Solan, supra note 72, at 199.
120 Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1769 (2003).
121 Id. at 1770-71; see also Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact
Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1867 (1966).
122 Allen & Pardo, supra note 120, at 1781.
123 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 234 (1985).
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either camp. It is situation specific, and thus factlike. Yet it involves
judgments about governing norms, and is thus lawlike. 124
The doctrinal incoherence of the law-fact distinction rears its head
on questions of law application, which cannot be categorized as law or
fact based on analytical considerations. Rather, as Monaghan argues,
categorization of law application poses an allocative question: "what
decisionmaker should decide the issue?"125 For negligence
determinations, application of the reasonableness standard is
categorized as fact (and thus assigned to juries) on the logic that:
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of
education and men of little education, men of learning and men
whose learning consists only in what they have themselves seen and
heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit
together, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life
to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average
judgment thus given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is
assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life
than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions
from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge. 126
The task of determining whether a particular statute applies to a
particular fact setting is law application. That is, "[i]t involves relating
the legal standard of conduct"-i.e., a statute-"to the facts established
by the evidence."127 Following Monaghan, that means that the
conventional view of statutory interpretation as "law," rendered without
consideration of institutional competencies, is too quick.
I should now take a cut at describing the kinds of activities for
which judges are well suited and the kinds of activities that favor juries.
Judges and juries bring different tools to the interpretive table. Judges
bring formal legal education, years of legal practice (usually), and a
perspective that extends across multiple cases. This background equips
judges to decide issues that depend on legal evidence, e.g., constitutional
principles and the common law background. It also equips judges to
perform well in tasks requiring analogical reasoning, that most
distinctive form of common law analysis.12s Juries bring numerosity,
which was the basis for the Condorcetian approach, as well as the
perspective of the ordinary or average citizen, what Justice Hunt called
knowledge of the "common affairs of life" in Stout.129 This "common
124 Id. at 236.
125 Id. at 237.
126 Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873).
127 Monaghan, supra note 123, at 236.
128 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741, 741 (1993)
("Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning.").
129 Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 664; see Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than
One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 205 (1989) ("The jury's competence, unlike that of the
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sense" not only empowers juries to determine questions of
"reasonableness,"130 but further equips them to make credibility
determinations and reconcile inconsistent evidence to resolve disputed
historical records. 131
The project of statutory interpretation can take many forms, each
of which requires a different set of capabilities. One can conjure
interpretive regimes in which judges will handily outperform jurors. For
instance, if one adopts as an interpretive rule that: "Statutory ambiguity
should be construed to make the law consistent with the English
common law during the reign of Henry VIII," judges will do vastly
better than juries. (We might also expect legal historians to outperform
judges, but that is another matter.) Such an interpretive decision-rule,
however, seems unlikely. The relevant question is whether juries or
judges are better situated with respect to the interpretive theories that
lawmakers might plausibly adopt.
For decades, three schools of interpretation have vied for
preeminence: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism.
132 It is
reasonable to presume that if forced to choose (by the need to approve
an interpretation jury instruction), lawmakers, whether legislative or
judicial, would settle on one of these candidates. Although the details of
the interpretive claims of each school are contestable, the basic shape of
the debate is clear. For textualists, "[s]tatutes are law, not evidence of
law."133 The search for statutory meaning is the search for the best
semantic reading of the text. For intentionalists, the subjective intention
of the enacting legislature (or legislators) is paramount. Statutory text is
a guide to those intentions, but only a guide. Finally, for purposivists,
interpretation is about finding and applying the reading that best
achieves the legislative purposes underlying a statute. 1
34
judge, rests partly on its ability to reflect the perspectives, experiences, and values of the ordinary
people in the community-not just the most common or typical community perspective, but the
whole range of viewpoints."); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges:
A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 503 (2005) ("Jurors, on the one hand, have
the benefit of being able to decide in groups and are expected to bring to the process values that
reflect the conscience of the community.").
130 See Monaghan, supra at note 123, at 232-33.
131 RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 41-63 (2003).
132 Andrei Marmor, Textualism in Context 2 (Univ. S. Cal. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, No. 12-13, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2112384; see also
VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 208-10.
133 In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.).
134 Some scholars claim that the distinctions between textualists, intentionalists, and
purposivists have narrowed or disappeared. This is primarily a claim about the methodological
tools deployed by adherents of the different models. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall
of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) ("Given that nonadherents and adherents of
textualism alike place great weight on statutory text and look beyond text to content, it is hard to
tell what remains of the textualism-purposivism debate."). At the level of theories of meaning, the
distinctions between textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism remain sharp. See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009).
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The Subsections below argue that, in the limited context of statutes
that govern the conduct of the general public, juries would be better
than judges at using the tools of and answering the interpretive
questions posed by these three schools of interpretation.
a. Textualism
The epistemic case for juries is strongest on textualist premises. As
John Manning noted in a recent historical review, the defining
characteristic of textualism is a commitment to the primacy of statutory
text.135 Notwithstanding theoretical differences between successive
generations of textualist scholars, textualists agree on the goal of
assigning statutes the meaning that "a reasonable person, conversant
with the relevant social and linguistic conventions," would give the
language. 136 As Manning puts it, textualists look for what "one would
ordinarily be understood as saying, given the circumstances in which
one said it."' 137
Textualists thus adopt, as their theory of meaning, that statutes
mean what ordinary members of the relevant linguistic community,
reading the statutes in context, understand them to mean. The question
is which courtroom actor-judge or jury-can best find such meaning
for jury-eligible statutes.
Because Chevron for Juries is limited to conduct-regulating statutes
of general applicability, the relevant linguistic community is the general
public. Judges are members of this community, but they are not
ordinary members. Judges are (usually) elite lawyers and, as Vermeule
explains,
[t]here is a crucial sense in which lawyers are not just like ordinary
people. They are part of an elite professional class, and their legal
training gives them distinctive professional biases, or is at least
correlated with such biases, which arise from self-selection into the
legal career by certain types. 138
At best, judges' legal training might make them good predictors of
ordinary meaning.
Jurors, by contrast, are drawn directly from the linguistic
community of the statutes with which Chevron for Juries is concerned.
They are a (mostly) random sample of the ordinary-language users
whose meaning textualism prioritizes.139 When asked to identify the
135 John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1287, 1293-98, 1303-07
(2010).
136 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2392-93 (2003).
137 Id. at 2397-98.
138 Vermeule, supra note 106, at 1588-89 (footnotes omitted).
139 This Article will return below to the question of whether the method by which juries are
selected is meaningfully random. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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ordinary meaning of a jury-eligible statutory phrase, jurors need not
predict anything. Rather, they must merely identify how they personally
understand the statutory language, and they are given the opportunity
to examine and develop their understanding through deliberation. On
textualist premises, juries are like focus groups.140 Their innate
understanding of ordinary meaning offers compelling epistemic
advantages. 141
b. Intentionalism
To intentionalists, the meaning of a statute in any particular
context is what the enacting legislature (or enacting legislators)
intended. 142 To discover intent, intentionalists look to the statutory text
and beyond it to legislative history of various forms, such as committee
reports and floor statements. If intentionalism was operationalized into
a Chevron for Juries "interpretation instruction," it might go something
like this:
You have been asked to decide whether a statute applies in this case.
To decide whether the statute applies, you must determine whether
140 Indeed, a committed textualist might go further, in two ways. First, the logic here might
support a much more radical proposal to submit interpretive questions that arise in litigation to
large-scale polls. Whether "interpretation by Gallup" makes logical sense depends on the
importance of deliberation. Even if deliberation is dispensable, however, such a system would be
procedurally unwieldy. It would also be quite expensive to submit every jury-eligible interpretive
question arising in litigation to a large-scale poll. Second, for statutes that are not "generally
applicable" because they apply only to a sub-set of the public-e.g., merchants-the 
"focus group"
logic cuts in favor of empanelling specialist juries. Of course, non-generalist juries raise serious
problems of their own. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
141 Two categories of statutes raise problems for textualists. First, statutes that incorporate
technical terms pose a potential difficulty. As Manning notes, "[a] given statutory phrase may
reflect the often elaborate (but textually unspecified) connotations of a technical term of art."
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 70, 81 (2006).
Such technical meanings can, but need not, be legal in origin. When statutes contain terms
beyond the jury's ken, the jury must rely on evidence and argument submitted by the parties.
Second, some statutes contain words whose meaning has shifted over time. See JOHN F. MANNING
& MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 201 (2010). Might judges do better
than juries when interpretation involves technical or antiquated terms? They might, but before an
interpreter can decide what a technical or antiquated term means, he must determine that a
particular phrase is a technical or antiquated term. That, on the textualist view, is a question for
an ordinary user of the statutory text. Lawrence Solum has argued that technical terms in legal
texts require a form of deference to specialists. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 54-55
(Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
But the decision to defer is necessarily premised on the decision that the words in a statute lack, or
are not best read as using, ordinary terminology. Just as jurors are uniquely situated to sniff out
ordinary meaning on the textualist view, so too are they well positioned to determine when
statutory text includes terms of art and antiquated terms. Even if judges might be marginally
better at interpreting such terms, this advantage is, on textualist premises, likely to be outweighed
by the jury's ability to differentiate between technical and antiquated meanings, on the one hand,
and ordinary meanings on the other.
142 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 213-18
(2000) (collecting sources); Marmor, supra note 132, at 2.
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the drafters of that statute intended or would have intended it to
apply to cases like this. In making this decision, you may consider the
text of the statute and evidence of legislative intent supplied to you
by the parties.
Our inquiry is whether juries are better equipped than judges to
answer the top-line interpretative question posed by intentionalism-
what did the drafters of this statute intend or what would they have
intended?-and to use the methodological tools that the theory
endorses. In the context of statutes that govern the conduct of the
general public, there are good reasons to think that they are.
Juries are persistently asked to render decisions about the
intentions of historical actors.143 Nearly all criminal statutes have
elements that oblige juries to decide what a defendant intended or knew
at a particular historical moment. So (by definition) do intentional torts.
Even more analogously, when a contract dispute turns on an
unintegrated or ambiguous written contract, juries are often asked to
"interpret" the contract by considering parol evidence.144 The forms of
evidence admissible to prove a legislator's intent-her statements and
omissions-are not obviously different from the statements and
omissions a lawyer might offer to prove the criminal or contractual
intentions of her client or opponent. This is true, moreover, regardless
whether the interpretive question is framed as demanding actual intent
or "imaginative reconstruction."145 When there is no evidence of actual
intent on a question, intentionalists fall back on imaginative
reconstruction. The intentionalist's goal in such cases is to determine,
given what she knows about the intentions of the enacting legislature on
related issues, how the legislature would have resolved the open
question.146 Thus, even when an intentionalist searches for hypothetical
intent, she is guided by evidence of historical intentions.
In the mine-run of cases, moreover, neither answering the top-line
question nor evaluating the permissible evidence depends on
application of a specifically "legal" body of knowledge. Legislators are
not usually legal experts, so legal knowledge is not generally pre-
143 JONAKAIT, supra note 131, at 41-63.
144 William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in the
Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 931, 939 ("Once it is determined that here
is an ambiguity or incompleteness, the question of how to resolve the ambiguity or what terms
were intended to supplement the written contract is commonly sent to the jury, because the
determination is based in part on contested extrinsic evidence.").
145 Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-
Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REv. 26, 46-47 (2008)
(describing imaginative reconstruction).
146 Id. at 52.
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requisite to understanding their statements.147 This is particularly the
case for the statutes that Chevron for Juries would make jury eligible, a
class that excludes statutes on legal topics addressed solely to official
decisionmakers or that assume technical or scientific knowledge.148
An oft-invoked critique of intentionalism is that for many
interpretive questions, both sides can point to supportive evidence in
the legislative history.149 Juries are specialists in making the credibility
determinations required to resolve evidentiary inconsistencies. 150 Where
such credibility determinations depend on largely non-legal evidence,
we have good reason to expect juries to outperform judges.
c. Purposivism
"Purposivism" here refers to the legal process method of Hart and
Sacks,151 which remains the dominant contemporary form of
purposivism.152 For purposivists, statutory meaning is intertwined with
a statute's policy and political purposes. As Hart and Sacks explained,
one interprets according to purpose by assuming that the legislature is
made up of "reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,"
and proceeding from there.13
"Reasonableness" is the core of legal process purposivism. Hart and
Sacks's six-word interpretive rubric invokes reasonableness three times,
telling the purposivist (i) what sort of person is in the legislature, (ii)
what sort of goals she has, and (iii) how she pursues them. As noted,
juries are assigned the task of animating the reasonable person in
negligence law because of their collective knowledge of the "ordinary
affairs of life." Having committed to the view that juries outperform
judges in determining how the reasonable person drives a car or
constructs a house, what basis is there to believe that judges prevail in
147 Committee reports, on the other hand, are often written by legally trained staff. To the
extent that such reports are indecipherable to lay jurors, it is fair to question whether they
meaningfully express the intent of lay legislators.
148 For instance, background legal knowledge probably is necessary to understand a discussion
on the Senate floor about diversity jurisdiction. Conduct-regulating statutes of general
applicability, on the other hand, are more typically directed to subject matters within the ordinary
person's grasp. See supra Part I.B. 1.
149 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 195 (1983). To paraphrase Judge Harold Leventhal, this leaves
the interpreter free to look over the crowd and select her friends. Redish & Murashko, supra note
145, at 48 (quoting Judge Leventhal).
150 JONAKAIT, supra note 131, at 41-63.
151 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (1958).
152 Manning, supra note 141, at 86 ("First, for many, [Hart and Sacks'] materials have come to
represent the canonical statement of purposivism."); Siegel, supra note 134, at 132 (calling Hart
and Sacks the "canonical expositors of purposivism").
153 HART & SACKS, supra note 151, at 1125.
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determining how a reasonable legislator legislates reasonable goals
reasonably?
An opponent of Chevron for Juries might respond that the
legislator, unlike the driver or the house-builder, is self-consciously
acting in a legal context. That answer privileges law over politics.
Legislators are political, not legal, actors. The question is whether a
judge is better equipped than a group of ordinary citizens to understand
and evaluate political action. Neither legal education nor the practice of
law orients judges to understand politics.154 Because juries possess the
trait-reasonableness-that purposivists ascribe (three times over) to
legislators, they are so oriented.
The opponent might respond that legislative staff is legally expert,
and members legislate with staff help. Perhaps because legal experts are
part of the legislative process, purposivists include among their
methodological tools "well-settled background legal assumptions," and
cany relevant [legal] canons of clear statement."15 The case for Chevron
for Juries is harder for purposivism than for textualism or
intentionalism because these methodological tools yield "legal" evidence
of meaning on which judges will obviously outperform juries. While the
jury-eligibility threshold addresses this concern by excluding technical
subject matters, it does not fully answer it. Purposivism's legal-context
tools, however, are the means to the end of applying the three layers of
reasonableness that determine meaning. Many of the background legal
concepts can be transmitted by lawyers and judges to juries.156 The
crucial task is deciding, in a given case, which tool best yields the
meaning of the reasonable legislator acting reasonably in pursuit of
reasonable goals. The judge's deeper knowledge of background legal
principles will not aid much in that project, but the jury's collective
knowledge of the "common affairs of life" will. Thus, even on
154 This is the premise underlying Christopher Eisgruber's suggestion that the Supreme Court
would be improved if it included lawyers with deep political experience. Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 115,
157 (2002).
155 Manning, supra note 141, at 90. But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L. REv. 901, 927 (2013) (demonstrating that congressional staffers are
generally aware of some interpretive canons by name, but not others).
156 For instance, if a litigant believes that the canon of noscitur a sociis-which holds that when
statutory terms "are associated in a context suggesting that the words have something in
common, they should be assigned a permissible meaning that makes them similar"-helps
determine the meaning of a reasonable legislator pursing reasonable goals reasonably, he can
argue that to the jury and seek an instruction on the canon. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 195 (2012) (describing the
noscitur a sociis canon). If the other party believes that the principle that each word in a statute
must be given independent meaning better approximates a reasonable legislative meaning, he can




purposivist assumptions, there is good reason to believe that juries have
an epistemic edge in the interpretation of statutes that govern the
conduct of the general public.
B. Political Legitimacy
Chevron's institutional logic is political as well as epistemic.
Chevron assigns interpretive primacy to administrative agencies in part
because the interpretations of agency officials command greater political
legitimacy than those of judges.57 This Section advances two sets of
arguments in support of the claim that, for statutes that govern the
conduct of the general public, jury interpretations likewise possess more
political legitimacy than judicial interpretations.
First, if we assume that people generally agree on the broad
political goals of statutory interpretation within the zone of ambiguity
(whether the goal is to do "justice," maximize welfare, or something
else), and disagree only on how best to achieve it, interpretation
becomes a species of problem solving. Recent social science research
suggests that diverse groups of reasonably competent individuals (like
juries) solve problems better than homogenous groups of people with
superior individual ability (like judges). Thus, to the extent that the
interpretation of jury-eligible statutes can be characterized as a problem
solving exercise, juries have a political advantage based on their superior
ability to achieve good results.
Second, juries can claim political legitimacy by virtue of their mode
of selection and deliberative processes. In the context of statutes that
govern the conduct of the general public, these processes gives the jury's
output a comparative advantage over that of judges.
1. Jurors as Diverse Problem Solvers
Research by economists Lu Hong and Scott Page shows that under
specified conditions, diversity is more valuable to problem solving than
ability. 158 This finding must be unpacked before we can use it to evaluate
the political legitimacy of jury versus judge statutory interpretation. But
first, some readers may question classifying cognitive diversity's virtues
157 See supra Part I.A.2.
158 SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007) [hereinafter THE DIFFERENCE]; Lu Hong & Scott
E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem
Solvers, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16385 (2004) [hereinafter Groups of Diverse Problem
Solvers]; Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents, 97 J. ECON. THEORY
123 (2001) [hereinafter Heterogeneous Agents].
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as political, rather than epistemic. The footnote below explains the
thinking behind that choice.19 The more important point, however, is
that nothing of substance turns on it. If the reader believes that the
jury's cognitive diversity adds to its epistemic, but not its political,
legitimacy, then by all means count it on that side of the ledger.
Hong and Page developed a computational model in which groups
of diverse computer agents competed with groups of homogenous but
smarter agents to solve problems.160 They found that the diverse agents
consistently outperformed the smarter agents. A formal mathematical
theorem confirmed the result that, on certain conditions, cognitive
diversity matters more to group performance than ability.161 While the
mathematics are beyond the scope of this Article, the conditions can be
stated plainly.162 First, the problem must be difficult enough that no
individual will always locate the optimal solution. Second, the problem
solvers must be reasonably intelligent. Third, the problem solvers must
be diverse. By diverse, Hong and Page refer not to identity diversity-
i.e., diversity of race, gender, class, or other demographic indicators-
but to cognitive diversity. Cognitive diversity is a function of two
variables: perspectives-how people "represent problems"-and
heuristics-how they "go about solving them."63 People are cognitively
diverse if, and to the extent that, they have different perspectives and
apply different heuristics. Fourth, there must be a sufficient number of
problem solvers. 164
These conditions intuitively apply to jury interpretations of statutes
that govern the conduct of the general public. As I argued above, for
many jury-eligible statutes, jurors must be reasonably intelligent
interpreters for the statute to survive constitutional scrutiny.165 When
such statutes are so complex that an ordinary citizen cannot achieve the
reasonably intelligent interpreter threshold, they cannot, consistent with
due process, govern his conduct. Juries, moreover, are diverse. In their
159 Hong and Page's thesis is that diverse groups can better maximize a "common value" than
non-diverse groups. Heterogeneous Agents, supra note 158, at 127; see also infra notes 169-70 and
accompanying text. This Article classifies the diversity argument for Chevron for Juries as political
because the pragmatic common values that juries would (I will suggest) maximize in statutory
interpretation need not match the formal epistemic criteria of any interpretive model. On some
interpretive models, to be sure, they will match, and when they do, the jury's diversity offers an
epistemic argument. In an effort to make the epistemic case for Chevron for Juries relatively
neutral between competing interpretive models, however, this Article treats diversity as serving a
political end.
160 Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers, supra note 158, at 16386.
161 Id. at 16387-89.
162 The mathematical proof in Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers, supra note 158, is aimed at
technical readers. Page's treatment of the diversity-trumps-ability theorem in THE DIFFERENCE,
supra note 158, however, is geared towards a broader audience.
163 Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers, supra note 158, at 16385.
164 THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 158, at 159-62.
165 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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computational model, Hong and Page assured diversity of agents by
selecting them at random. Juries are picked in largely the same way. It is
reasonable to presume that the varied backgrounds of jurors result in
diverse perspectives and heuristics. The remaining conditions of Hong
and Page's theorem-difficulty and numerosity-are likely satisfied or
unimportant. 166
Judges, of course, are also "reasonably intelligent" statutory
interpreters. In fact, we should assume that individual judges are better
interpreters than individual jurors. Judges are not, however, especially
diverse. They share (at least) common educational backgrounds, high
social standing, and economic security.167 These common attributes
likely dampen differences in perspectives and heuristics. Hong and
Page's diversity-trumps-ability thesis thus provides grounds to believe
that the diversity of juries will yield better problem solving outcomes
than the individual ability of judges.
Before we assign political legitimacy to the jury on this basis,
however, we must consider whether statutory interpretation is a form of
"problem solving," as Hong and Page's model is limited to that activity.
Hong and Page define problem solving as "the process by which
economic actors find solutions to problems that generate revenues.168
Revenue is a broad concept that includes "searching for cures to
diseases, developing software, handling legal cases, and constructing
social policies."169 In light of this expansive understanding of revenue,
problem solving for Hong and Page can be understood as the task of
maximizing value. For groups to "problem solve," this means that group
members must share a "common value function." 170
Statutory interpretation is thus "problem solving" only if
interpreters approach the lawmaking aspect of their task with a
common value function. At one level, it is obvious that lawmakers of
any sort do not approach lawmaking with unified ends. Different
political and philosophical programs prioritize different values.171 But
we are not talking here of lawmaking generally, but about the particular
166 The difficulty condition is important to Hong and Page's model, but not to this Article.
When statutory interpretation questions are easy, we need not worry much about who does the
interpreting. Juries also appear to be sufficiently numerous to take advantage of the diversity-
trumps-ability thesis. Hong and Page found diversity advantages in their computational models in
groups as small as ten. Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers, supra note 158, at 16387.
167 See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 270 (2007) (noting
that jurors "differ from the judge, who is likely to be a member of a socioeconomic elite and
whose views might become jaded from hearing case after case"); Vermeule, supra note 106, at
1578.
168 Heterogeneous Agents, supra note 158, at 123.
169 Id. at 123-24.
170 Id. at 127.




task of selecting, for the purpose of a concrete case, from among
plausible interpretations of statutes that govern the conduct of the
general public. This is a political task, to be sure, but one more likely to
be approached pragmatically than by reference to broad political or
philosophical agendas. Statutory interpretation in practice is the stuff of
"low-level principles," not high theory.172 When juries set out to
determine how or if a conduct-regulating statute applies to a particular
fact setting, one value function or another will, at least sometimes,
emerge as the obvious choice.
It suffices for present purposes that to some extent and in some
instances, common value functions do emerge on the limited political
task that Chevron for Juries would assign to juries. Where they do,
juries, by virtue of their diversity, offer meaningful political advantages
over judges.
2. Jury Decisions as Democratic
Cognitive diversity provides some support for this Article's claim
that juries have greater political legitimacy than judges in interpreting
statutes that govern the conduct of the general public. More robust
support emerges from comparing the democratic pedigree of jury and
judicial decisions.
Associating the jury with democracy is far from novel.173 Indeed,
the jury's democratic status is the opening premise for much
commentary about juries. The "juries and democracy" linkage, however,
consists of at least three sorts of claims that should be disentangled. One
claim is that the jury system promotes democratic values outside the
courtroom.74 A second claim, most commonly associated with the
criminal jury, posits the jury as a popular check against the exercise of
state power. 75 The third claim-and the only one that concerns us
here-is that the decisions juries make are themselves democratic.
172 Id. at 1753 ("Most judicial activity does not involve constitutional interpretation, and the
ordinary work of common law decision and statutory interpretation calls for low-level
principles.").
173 See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 6 (1994) ("The whole point [of juries] is to subject law to a democratic
interpretation...."); JAMES GOBERT, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND THE JURY 99-133 (1997)
(arguing for jury's democratic status); Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by
Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1286-87 n. 18-20 (1984) (collecting sources).
174 See, e.g., JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES Civic ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2010).
175 See Solomon, supra note 106, at 1337 n.26 (collecting sources).
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The connection between jury output and democracy is curious.
176
Juries do not look much like typical modern democratic institutions.
Jurors are selected randomly, not by election or appointment. Once
selected, moreover, jurors are shielded from unsupervised contact with
those interested in their decisions. (Consider the uproar that would
ensue if members of Congress were barred from meeting with
constituents outside the presence of a judge.) Nonetheless, jury
decisions have both majoritarian and deliberative democratic
provenance, while the decisions of judges have no comparable source of
political legitimacy. This comparative political advantage of juries puts a
thumb on the scale for juries and, as this Section will argue, there is no
countervailing political reason offsetting it for statutes that govern the
conduct of the general public.
a. The Democratic Legitimacy of Jury Decisions
The political legitimacy of jury decisions rests on two democratic
norms: majoritarianism and deliberation.
Majoritarianism. Because (and to the extent that) jurors are drawn
randomly from the general population, juries embody what political
philosophers call "descriptive representation."'77 A person represents
another "descriptively" if he is "sufficiently like [his] fellows for
someone to be reasonably safe in drawing conclusions about the other
members of [his] generation from what they know about [him]."178 A
descriptively representative body resembles the larger public
demographically and ideologically. Due to this resemblance, descriptive
representation has long been associated with majoritarian democracy. 179
Descriptive representation is written into the constitutional law of
criminal juries and prescribed by statute for civil juries. Once conflicts
of interest are eliminated, modern jury practice presumes that any
citizen is as competent as any other citizen to serve as a juror.
1 80 In
criminal cases, "the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross
176 Id. at 1339 ("Though the jury is used as a model or jumping-off point for many other ideas
in democratic theory, the place of the jury itself in democratic theory and practice has received
relatively little scrutiny.").
177 A. Phillips Griffiths, How Can One Person Represent Another?, in REPRESENTATION 133
(Hanna Fenichel Pitkin ed., 1969); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
60-91 (1967).
178 Griffiths, supra note 177, at 135-36.
179 John Adams, for instance, linked descriptive representation to democracy when he
announced that a representative assembly should be "a miniature exact portrait of the people at
large." John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 189, 195
(Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1851); see also PITKIN, supra note 177, at
86 (noting that descriptive representation need not, as a logical proposition, be linked to
democracy, but recognizing the historical association).
180 Or at least it has since the elimination of "blue ribbon" juries of experts. See ABRAMSON,
supra note 173, at 99-100 (explaining "key man" system of jury selection abandoned in the 1960s
and 1970s); Amar, supra note 173, at 1287 (same).
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section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial."1s While the Sixth Amendment does
not apply to civil cases, Congress requires that civil juries in federal
cases be drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 182 The
representative cross-section requirement ensures, in the aggregate, that
jury pools contain the same mix of demographic characteristics,
interests, and political perspectives as the demos. As Justice Black
explained in 1940, "[ilt is part of the established tradition in the use of
juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community."183
To be sure, the fair cross-section requirement applies to jury pools,
not seated juries. 184 Both legally and statistically, we can thus expect that
particular juries will not perfectly represent a cross section of the
community. This limitation cuts somewhat against the claim that the
jury system achieves descriptive representation. We are concerned less,
however, with the democratic pedigree of a particular jury than with
that of the jury system as a whole. If the jury selection system is not
systematically biased against particular kinds of jurors,185 then juries in
the aggregate are broadly (descriptively) representative. 186
Because Chevron for Juries works better if the jury selection process
is as random as possible, moreover, it might be coupled with
randomness-enhancing doctrinal modifications. For instance, American
jurisdictions are split about whether lawyers may pose hypothetical
questions in voire dire "in order to identify potentially problematic
attitudes towards legal issues that are likely to arise during the trial." 187
Chevron for Juries raises the stakes of this split. If lawyers can select
181 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
182 See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) ("[All litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall
have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the
community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."). Even without the statute, the
Supreme Court would likely require that federal civil jury panels be drawn from a fair cross
section. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 221,225 (1946).
183 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527 ("[Tihe American
concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.").
184 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,477-78 (1990).
185 Some argue that it is. E.g., Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing the 'Fair Cross-Section'
Requirement, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 931 (2011); David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A
Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 776 (1977); Solomon, supra note 106, at
1357-59. Their objections are generally not to the fair cross-section requirement in principle, but
to the legal doctrines established to implement it.
186 To put this point more squarely into context, the question analyzed here is whether juries
have the democratic pedigree to make the political choices that are implicit in statutory
interpretation within the zone of ambiguity. As a matter of social policy, we are more concerned
about patterns of jury statutory interpretations than individual decisions. See Gary J. Jacobsohn,
Citizen Participation in Policy-Making: The Role of the Jury, 39 J. POL. 73 (1977). Thus, so long as
the jury system in the aggregate is descriptively representative-as the cross-section requirement
demands-the democratic legitimacy point holds.
187 NANcY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES § 3.17 (2d ed. 2009).
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jurors who take a view of the law favorable to their side, the resulting
panels will be distinctly not a random sample. A jurisdiction adopting
Chevron for Juries would thus want to side with those jurisdictions that
disallow such questions.
Deliberative Democracy. For deliberative democrats, political
legitimacy is accorded outcomes that result from deliberation, i.e., "the
serious consideration of arguments and counter-arguments for and
against policy alternatives."188 Deliberation is a defining and
constitutionally required aspect of the jury decisionmaking process.1
8 9
To deliberative democrats, the jury is "the quintessential deliberative
democratic body."190 Jenia Iontcheva has explained the jury's appeal to
deliberative democrats.191 The public sphere does not offer ordinary
citizens many opportunities to deliberate with each other directly,
without mediation from professional elites. The jury, Iontcheva
explains, "stands out as a precious exception."192 Institutional features of
the jury-including the random selection of jury panels, the prohibition
on certain forms of discrimination, and the jury's small size-enhance
deliberation. 193 Most importantly, the requirement of unanimity is the
ultimate deliberation-forcing rule.194 Empirical research confirms not
only that deliberation affects outcomes, but that it improves jurors'
comprehension of the evidence.195 Thus, both theoretically and
empirically, the jury system embraces the principles of deliberative
democracy. 196
The jury system's majoritorian and deliberative bona fides reflect
that it is the preeminent modern example of "sortive" democracy.197
Sortition is the idea, classical in origin, that some government officials
188 James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, The Quest for Deliberative Democracy, 9 GOOD SOC'Y
3 (1999).
189 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 226-28 (1978); Nancy S. Marder, Cyberjuries: A Model of
Deliberative Democracy?, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS OF POLITICAL RENEWAL
THROUGH THE INTERNET 35, 36 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004) ("The jury is a truly deliberative
institution in that after seeing the evidence and hearing the testimony and arguments, the jurors
meet behind closed doors to exchange ideas until they reach a verdict.").
190 Iontcheva, supra note 73, at 346; see also Marder, supra note 189, at 36 ("The American
jury, in both civil and criminal cases, is an institution that embodies the deliberative democratic
ideal.").
191 Iontcheva, supra note 73, at 345-50.
192 Id. at 346.
193 Id. at 346-47.
194 Id. at 347.
195 Id. at 347-48.
196 But see Solomon, supra note 106, at 1365-67 (arguing that juries deviate from the
principles of deliberative democracy because they do not give reasons for their decisions and
because their rulings are not "ongoing and provisional").
197 See Richard G. Mulgan, Lot as a Democratic Device of Selection, in LOTTERIES IN PUBLIC
LIFE: A READER 126 (Peter Stone ed., 2011) [hereinafter LOTTERIES IN PUBLIC LIFE].
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can be "chosen by lot."198 Long neglected by political theorists, sortition
has lately enjoyed a resurgence of interest,199 and both descriptive
representation200 and deliberation20 are in its DNA.
The jury's sortive credentials confer democratic legitimacy on its
decisions. It is a different sort of legitimacy, of course, than what the
Supreme Court approved in Chevron itself. Administrative agencies are
politically legitimate because-and to the extent that-they are
politically accountable. When agencies go astray, they can be checked by
the people's representatives in Congress and the White House.202 Not so
juries, whose exercise of power is unaccountable. Accountability,
however, is merely one form of political legitimacy. This Article's claim
198 Id. at 126-27. As a political practice, sortition reached its high-water mark in ancient
Greece. Athenians filled their Council and large juries by lottery. Id. at 127-28. The Council was a
body that prepared the agenda for, and implemented the decisions of, the popular assembly of
citizens. They also used sortition to fill a variety of public offices, but excluded offices requiring
particular skill or expertise, such as positions of military and financial leadership. Id. Aristotle
endorsed the practice, arguing that all offices, or all that do not require experience or skill, should
be filled by lot. Aristotle, POLITICS, Book VI, Ch. 2.
199 Aside from a high-profile endorsement by Jean Jacques Rousseau and sporadic
experimentation, sortition had little significance in democratic theory until the twentieth century.
See Fredrik Engelstad, The Assignment of Political Office by Lot, in LOTTERIES IN PUBLIC LIFE,
supra note 197, at 219; Jean Jacques Rousseau, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Book IV, Ch. 3. This
dormancy gave way when a Swedish sociologist, Vilhelm Aubert, published a paper on
randomness in social decisionmaking in 1959. Vilhelm Aubert, Chance in Social Affairs, in
LOTTERIES IN PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 197. A recent literature review found more than 350 post-
Aubert writings on sortition. Antoine Vergne, A Brief Survey of the Literature of Sortition: Is the
Age of Sortition Upon Us?, in SORTITION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (Gil Dalonnoi & Oliver
Dowlen eds. 2010) [hereinafter SORTITION: THEORY AND PRACTICE].
200 E.g., Engelstad, supra note 199, at 221-22; Mulgan, supra note 197, at 143-44; Yves
Sintomer, Random Selection and Deliberative Democracy: Note for an Historical Comparison, in
SORTITION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 199, at 40-51; Joel Matthew Parker, Randomness
and Legitimacy in Selecting Democratic Representatives (Dec. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Texas), available at https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/
handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4923/PARKER-DISSERTATION.pdfsequence= 1.
201 The relationship between sortition and deliberative democracy is, however, complex. One
could randomly pick political officials who act without deliberating. Deliberation and sortition
often travel together because sortition solves a basic problem in the deliberative model. For
deliberation to be effective, James Fishkin and Robert Luskin explain, deliberators must be
immersed in "policy-relevant arguments and counter-arguments." Fishkin & Luskin, supra note
188, at 3. The general public (the demos) is not so immersed. Indeed, according to an influential
account, it is irrational for ordinary citizens to immerse themselves in the details of public policies
that they have no realistic chance of impacting. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political
Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135, 147 (1957). Sortition yields assemblies that resemble
the demos. Because of the small size of sortive decisionmaking bodies, however, the "rational
ignorance" logic no longer holds. Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 188, at 4.
202 See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1243, 1294 (1999) ("Congress also serves as a significant check on both the individual
agencies and on the executive branch generally."); Kagan, supra note 8, at 2383 (describing the
"most important development in the last two decades in administrative process" as the
"presidentialization of administration-the emergence of enhanced methods of presidential
control over the regulatory state").
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is that the jury's majoritarian and deliberative mechanisms bestow a
substitute form.
b. Juries Versus Judges
The democratic legitimacy of jury decisions is one side of the
comparative equation. We must also examine the political legitimacy of
judges. Specifically, we must compare the democratic legitimacy of
juries interpreting conduct-regulating, generally-applicable statutes to
the legitimacy of judges interpreting the same statutes.
The democratic pedigree of federal judges is controversial. Federal
judges are nominated by a democratic official-the President-and
confirmed by a democratic body-the Senate. This selection process
confers a form of democratic pedigree.03 Indeed, the selection of judges
looks a lot like that of senior executive branch officials whose statutory
judgments are afforded Chevron deference partly because of their
political legitimacy. The guaranty of lifetime tenure, however, changes
the calculus dramatically. Administrative officials garner democratic
legitimacy both ex ante, from their selection, and ex post, by virtue of
their relationship with the President. By design, judges lack ex post
accountability. Their political legitimacy thus depends entirely on the
moment of appointment, which becomes more historically than
politically salient with the passage of time.204 For instance, as of this
writing, appointees of President Johnson remain seated as federal
judges. The political circumstances of the 1960s that produced their
appointments are surely of historical interest, but they bear little
political connection to the contemporary polity. The general point is
that judicial tenure and democratic pedigree are inversely related. As the
temporal distance from appointment grows longer, a judge's claim to a
democratic pedigree shrinks.205
In constitutional law, the judiciary's democratic deficit comes
under the header of the "countermajoritarian difficulty."206 Adherents of
the difficulty question the democratic legitimacy of constitutional
judicial review on the grounds that it gives unelected, unaccountable
officials power to trump the judgments of elected, accountable ones.
20 7
The "countermajoritarian difficulty" plays a less prominent role in
203 Eisgruber, supra note 154, at 125.
204 Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 9
(2004).
205 To be clear, there are important reasons why judges serve for life. Id. As Judge Easterbrook
notes, however, tenure has a "dark side." Id. at 9-10. Its dark side should not be disregarded when
allocating authority within legal systems.
206 E.g., BICKEL, supra note 4.
207 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 5; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM




debates about statutory interpretation.208 The reason for the difficulty's
omission from commentary about statutory interpretation is the
continuing pull of "legislative supremacy," the principle that judges
deciding questions of statutory interpretation should stay out of the way
of legislative policymaking.209 But while "legislative supremacy" is a
worthy aspiration,2o it is inadequate as a democratic justification for the
practice of statutory interpretation by judges.
William Eskridge noted more than twenty-five years ago that "the
emerging view among historians, literary theorists, and legal scholars is
that interpretation itself inevitably involves the 'creation' of meaning."211
Once we recognize that to interpret law is to make law, we must pay
close attention to the democratic pedigree of our interpreters. Because
statutory interpretation unavoidably implies lawmaking, statutory
interpretation by judges implies lawmaking by unelected, unaccountable
officials. Statutory interpretation by judges thus presents similar
concerns to the countermajoritarian difficulty in constitutional law.212
Judicial decisions cannot match the political legitimacy of jury
decisions. While comparing the democratic pedigree of sortive
208 There are exceptions. See Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV.
1, 6-7 (2007) ("Scholars of statutory interpretation and constitutional theory grapple with the
same core problem, even if they often fail to acknowledge the overlap. Both bodies of scholarship
struggle to define and defend judicial power in a democracy."); Maimon Schwarzschild, Keeping It
Private, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 687 (2007) ("The problem of judges as lawmakers in a
democratic society is a familiar one. Judges are not readily answerable to the electorate. Hence,
judicial lawmaking is in tension with democratic legitimacy, if not at odds with it."); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REv.
1073, 1120 (1992) ("As in constitutional interpretation, scholars in the statutory field are
confronted with the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty-the problem of life-tenured,
unelected judges making policy decisions. If all or most statutory cases turn on policy factors left
to the judge's choice, how can that exercise of power be considered legitimate?" (footnote
omitted)).
209 Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995).
210 Indeed, a central axis of the "war" over statutory interpretation has been about which
methodological approach best constrains judges and empowers Congress. To say, as this Article
does in the text, that legislative supremacy is an inadequate political justification is not to say that
we should be indifferent to the constraints imposed on statutory interpreters. Put differently,
while the Chevron for Juries proposal advanced in this Article is (mostly) indifferent to
interpretive methodology, it is not nihilistic. Methodological choices matter a great deal.
211 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1498
(1987); see also Lemos, supra note 21, at 431 ("The notion that statutory interpretation by courts
does not require resort to the sort of policymaking discretion that agencies enjoy has overtimes of
legal formalism, under which judges 'found' the law rather than creating it. As such, it is subject to
many of the same critiques.").
212 To be sure, the countermajoritarian difficulties are not exactly the same. Judicial review in
constitutional cases poses the judiciary as Congress's antagonist. No defensible theory of statutory
interpretation makes enemies of courts and Congress. Rather, when courts interpret ambiguity in
statutes, they are filling Congress's gaps, be they intentional delegations, legislative oversights, or
the byproducts of loose language. While gap filling requires law creation (and thus implicates
questions of democracy) it need not be law creation at odds with Congress.
1332 [Vol. 36:1287
CHEVRON FOR JURIES
institutions to electoral ones involves difficult tradeoffs, it is much easier
to compare a sortive institution, the jury, to an institution, the federal
judiciary, that is neither sortive nor electoral. This comparative political
advantage of juries provides a general reason-i.e., a reason
unconnected to a specific subject matter-for a democratically
committed polity to prefer allocating decisionmaking power to juries.213
This Article's analysis, moreover, is not general but specific to
statutes that govern the conduct of the general public. The question is
whether, with respect to the interpretation of those statutes, a political
rationale exists to overcome a general democratic preference for juries.
There is not. The most plausible candidates come from theories of
constitutional judicial review. Proponents of judicial review have
advanced several political rationales to explain why constitutional
decisionmaking should be allocated to unelected judges rather than
democratic legislatures. Thus, judicial review has been justified as
protecting, as against short-sighted majorities, the democratic
process,214 constitutionally-enshrined political values,215 and moments
of "higher" lawmaking.16 Generally-applicable, conduct-regulating
statutes, however, do not ordinarily implicate high-level problems about
the democratic process, constitutionally-enshrined political values, or
higher lawmaking.217 Whether the arguments for judicial review succeed
in the constitutional arena or not, they offer no political support to the
practice of judicial interpretation of these statutes. Put differently, while
there may be good reasons-even democratic reasons-to keep
constitutional interpretation away from majorities, they do not apply to
the interpretation of statutes that govern the conduct of the general
public.
213 For a contrary view, see Solomon, supra note 106, at 1361 ("I aim merely to complicate the
picture of the civil jury's claim to normative legitimacy on [the democratic legitimacy] score.").
214 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 116-18
(1980).
215 BICKEL, supra note 4, at 24-26.
216 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 9-13 (1991).




This Article next considers several likely objections to Chevron for
Juries.
A. (Absence of) Precedent
Under Chevron for Juries, judges would not issue opinions that
prospectively establish statutory meaning. Juries, moreover, lack any
forward-looking mechanism to fix the meaning of statutes. The Chevron
for Juries interpretive framework is thus, to a significant degree, non-
precedential.218 This leads to several potential objections, as described in
the Subsections that follow.
1. Predictability of Legal Outcomes
First, an opponent might object that Chevron for Juries makes the
law less predictable. Judicial interpretations allow those subject to
ambiguous statutes to arrange their affairs to be on the right side of the
law. If we eliminate judicial interpretations, the objector would argue,
the opportunity of citizens to ensure compliance goes too. While legal
uncertainty imposes economic costs in civil matters, the objector would
likely emphasize the criminal context, where the "fair notice" principle
has the most pull.219
The objection has clear intuitive force. But on closer inspection, the
relationship between Chevron for Juries and legal predictability is more
complex than the objection suggests. The overall predictability of a legal
system is a function of two variables: (i) the precision of its prediction
tools, and (ii) the accessibility of those tools.220 The objection under
consideration goes to the first variable. That is, the objection is based on
218 To a significant degree, but not entirely. As with traditional Chevron, courts in a Chevron
for Juries framework would issue precedential decisions defining the boundaries of permissible
statutory meaning. Part I.B describes two procedural mechanisms-dispositive motions and
motions in limine-through which courts can police the limits of statutory ambiguity. For
instance, if a defendant convinces an appellate court that a skateboard cannot reasonably be
understood as subject to the ban on vehicles in the park, it will be established with certainty that
skateboards are not vehicles. It is only within the zone of ambiguity that Chevron for Juries lacks
interpretive precedents.
219 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. On one influential account, the uncertainty
inherent in Chevron for Juries might be a feature, not a bug, of the proposal. See William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 578 (2001) (arguing that
statutory "specificity," in the criminal law context, "is perverse").
220 Cf Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal
Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 747 (2014) ("[L]aw, in a democracy,
must be easily accessible to citizens.").
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the fact that Chevron for Juries would (in one context) remove from
circulation a relatively precise predictive tool, the judicial opinion. But if
Chevron for Juries offsets that reduction, it could still be net-positive for
legal predictability. There are reasons to think it might, or that it would
come close.
Both clear statutes and clear cases enhance legal predictability. But
from the perspective of someone seeking to predict legal outcomes, clear
statutes are "cheaper" than clear cases, holding the level of clarity
constant.22' The statutes for any given jurisdiction can generally be
found in a single codified source.222 Court rulings, by contrast, are
scattered. Federal caselaw is made by judges across ninety-four districts,
thirteen circuits, and one Supreme Court, all of whose decisions must be
consulted to fully "predict" the meaning of an ambiguous federal
statute. Statutes, moreover, are (largely) organized topically, again
unlike judicial opinions. Whether a person tries to find the law on his
own or hires a lawyer to help, his search costs are lower if he can find a
clear statute to guide his conduct than if he must consult caselaw.
Clarity from statutes thus increases the accessibility of prediction
tools-the second variable of overall predictability-more than clarity
from cases.
While Chevron for Juries prevents clear caselaw for interpretive
questions within its domain, there are two reasons to think that it could
lead to clearer statutes. First, genuine uncertainty over statutory
meaning generates political pressure for legislative clarification. For
instance, if moped lovers and moped opponents are uncertain whether a
ban on vehicles in the park applies to mopeds, they will join together to
pressure politicians to clarify the law. This political pressure will lead, in
many cases, to democratically imposed certainty, either in the form of
clearer legislation or a delegation to an administrative agency. The
current system releases the pressure by settling the question in a
relatively non-democratic forum. Once settled by the courts, moreover,
the winning side (either the riders or the anti-moped interest group) has
every incentive to block legislative action. Chevron for Juries obstructs
the release valve. In this sense, it is both clarity-forcing and democracy-
forcing. 223
221 This is not necessarily the case if the level of clarity is not held constant. That is, if opinions
are clearer than statutes, it does not make legal research less expensive to take them away. In that
circumstance, legal research becomes probabilistic. To determine "statutory meaning," legal
researchers have to identify the frequency of interpretive outcomes. That is obviously more
expensive than researching cases.
222 To be sure, this was not the case in the days before codification. See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some
Reflections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 283, 287-90 (2007) (lamenting this
development).
223 Moreover, Chevron for Juries avoids a common problem with democracy-forcing tools.
Adrian Vermeule has criticized democracy-forcing interpretive tools, such as clear statement rules
and legislative factfinding requirements, on the grounds that they require coordination that the
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The second reason Chevron for Juries could promote statutory
clarity is that it would revitalize the void-for-vagueness doctrine. As
noted above, in theory the vagueness doctrine "protects persons by
providing 'fair notice' of a statute's applicability and by preventing
'arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions' of a statute's
enforcement."224 As a practical matter, however, courts rarely invalidate
statutes as void-for-vagueness.22s In part, this is because current law
allows courts to look to judicial interpretations of statutes to cure
vagueness that appears on the face of a statute.226 In a Chevron for Juries
framework that denies judges the opportunity to interpret certain vague
statutes, such cures would be impossible. The likely result would be an
increase in the frequency of vagueness findings.227 In some instances,
Congress might respond by enacting clearer legislation on the subject.228
More generally, invigorated enforcement of the vagueness doctrine
would discourage the strategic legislative use of ambiguity.229 Both
legislative responses tend toward clearer statutes.
The overall effect of Chevron for Juries on legal predictability in
both the criminal and civil contexts depends on the relationship
judiciary cannot achieve. VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 119. Chevron for Juries requires no
coordination because it structurally precludes the formation of binding precedent within the zone
of ambiguity of jury-eligible statutes.
224 United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 333 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358, 411 (2010)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 107 (2012).
225 Cf Robert Batey, The Vagueness Doctrine in the Roberts Court: Constitutional Orphan, 80
UMKC L. REV. 113, 113-14 (2011) ("The conclusion one draws is that with the death of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and the retirements of Justices O'Connor and Stevens, there may well be no one
on the Court who cares enough about the vagueness doctrine to think deeply about it." (footnotes
omitted)).
226 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 35, at 658-64; Jeffries, supra note 116, at 207-08.
227 Some might count this as a cost of Chevron for Juries. The normative status of judicial cures
to statutory vagueness is an important question that this Article cannot hope to adequately
address. It is similar, however, to the democracy-forcing logic presented in the text. A reader who
rejects the claim that Chevron for Juries is democracy forcing, or one who rejects that this is a
point in its favor, is unlikely to accept the claim that reinvigorated vagueness enforcement is a
good thing.
228 Of course, Congress might not reenact invalidated legislation. In many contexts, that too
promotes predictability. The principle nulla poena sine lege-"[n]o punishment without a law
authorizing it"-applies to many areas governed by conduct-regulating generally-applicable
statutes. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (9th ed. 2009); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S.
451, 467-68 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the maxim nulla poena sine lege "has been
described as one of the most 'widely held value-judgment[s] in the entire history of human
thought' (alteration in original) (quoting J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 59 (2d
ed. 1960))). That principle obviously has a high degree of predictability. Statutory disruptions of it
thus tend to increase unpredictability. Where Congress does not reenact invalidated legislation
that operated against this background principle, the overall predictability of the legal system
increases.
229 See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1128-34 (2011)
(describing the strategic use of ambiguity). Not all statutory ambiguity is strategic, of course.
Some is the product of legislative inadvertence. See Foster, supra note 54, at 1906.
1336
CHEVRON FOR JURIES
between the two variables described above: (i) the reduction in
predictability generated by the loss of judicial interpretations, and (ii)
the increase in predictably resulting from clearer statutes, compounded
by the relative accessibility of statutes as compared to cases. While I lack
empirical data to claim that Chevron for Juries is net-positive to legal
predictability, that result is plausible. Perhaps more importantly, given
the offsetting effects on predictability in play, it seems unlikely that
Chevron for Juries is substantially negative.
2. Consistency
The opponent might also object that Chevron for Juries yields
inconsistency-and thus inequality-across cases. We can return again
to honest services fraud to illustrate the point. It seems inevitable that
juries would disagree about the meaning of "honest services." Such
disagreement could easily result in inconsistent adjudications for
identical conduct. One jury might conclude that an employee's failure to
disclose a conflict of interest deprived his employer of his honest
services and send the employee to prison. Another jury might disagree
and let the employee walk. 230
Virtually all legal reform proposals have costs, and inconsistency is
a real cost of Chevron for Juries. That said, the "consistency gap"
between the existing interpretive framework and Chevron for Juries is
smaller than it initially appears. While this is especially true if Chevron
for Juries would lead to clearer and more easily applied statutes, as the
previous Subsection suggested, the point holds even if that prediction
fails.
Inconsistency is inevitable in the face of ambiguous statutes.231
Ambiguity necessitates interpretive discretion, which leads to
inconsistency across decision-makers. Different systems for resolving
statutory ambiguities deal with the inconsistency in different ways. The
central distinction between Chevron for Juries and the existing
interpretive framework (on this issue) is that the inconsistency of
Chevron for Juries would be more persistent.232 But persistence is not
230 I am indebted to Al Alschuler for suggesting this example. The example assumes, of course,
that "honest services" fraud would survive vagueness scrutiny under Chevron for Juries.
231 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REv. 1567, 1585-86 (2008).
232 Another distinction between the existing framework and Chevron for Juries has to do with
the kinds of inconsistency the framework permits. Matthew Stephenson has explained that when
deciding whether to delegate interpretive authority to the courts or an agency, Congress faces a
tradeoff between two kinds of inconsistency: inter-issue inconsistency-which courts tend to
produce-and intertemporal inconsistency-which agencies tend to produce. Matthew C.
Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice between




the only normatively relevant measure of inconsistency. The existing
framework permits inconsistent results up to the point at which the
highest relevant appellate court resolves an interpretive question. In at
least one important respect, the inconsistency of that regime is more
perverse than the inconsistency of Chevron for Juries.
Under the existing framework, a person can rely on a lower court's
statutory interpretation only to find, after his conduct is complete, that
the interpretation has been reversed by a higher court. This is not
merely a theoretical concern. In United States v. Rodgers,233 the Supreme
Court reversed the dismissal of an indictment against a man who lied to
the FBI and Secret Service to induce the agencies to open
investigations.234 At the time, well-established law in the defendant's
federal circuit provided explicitly that such lies were outside the scope of
the charged statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
ruled that its contrary interpretation would apply to him retroactively.235
While such extreme cases of judicial inconsistency are likely rare, where
they occur the damage to consistency and equality values seems far
worse than the predictably persistent inconsistency of Chevron for
Juries.236
3. Litigation Costs
Finally, the opponent could object that Chevron for Juries raises
litigation costs, as it forces litigants to argue repeatedly about statutory
meaning. This objection also hits upon a real cost of Chevron for Juries.
For example, under the existing regime, litigants in honest services
fraud cases need not, after Skilling, expend any resources arguing about
what "honest services" means.237 Instead they can take as given that
233 466 U.S. 475 (1984).
234 Id. at 479.
235 Id. at 484. The Court held the defendant o a high standard of prescience:
[Any argument by respondent against retroactive application to him of our present
decision, even if he could establish reliance upon the earlier [circuit] decision, would be
unavailing since the existence of conflicting cases from other Courts of Appeals made
review of that issue by this Court and decision against he position of the respondent
reasonably foreseeable.
Id.; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal
Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455 (2001) (criticizing Rodgers' retroactivity analysis).
236 To be clear, the argument here is not purely consequentialist. Chevron for Juries can lead to
the same sort of unexpected results as the existing framework If juries divide on an interpretive
question 99% to 1%, those litigants who find themselves in the 1% will surely be surprised at the
result, just as litigants are surprised in cases where an appellate court revises statutory meaning.
The point is about the reasonableness of the litigants' expectations. When a court has blessed an
interpretation, reliance on that interpretation seems eminently justified. Jury results do not lead to
a similar expectation of consistency.
237 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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"honest services" means bribes and kickbacks, and focus their
arguments around those concepts. In a Chevron for Juries framework,
by contrast, assuming the honest services statute survived vagueness
scrutiny, the litigants would have to develop a theory of the meaning of
"honest services" and gather supporting evidence. The expense of that
effort would vary depending on what sources of interpretive evidence a
jurisdiction permits. In a jurisdiction endorsing an intentionalist theory
of interpretation, for instance, the work would likely include gathering
legislative history, but some cost will be associated with the project no
matter what interpretive theory a jurisdiction selects. That cost makes
litigation more expensive in a world with Chevron for Juries than in the
world without it.
Chevron for Juries also reduces law-related costs, however, which
may offset the increased cost of litigation, at least in part. Specifically,
Chevron for Juries would reduce legal research costs for both official and
nonofficial actors. As argued above, legal research of statutes is cheaper
than legal research of caselaw.238 Because Chevron for Juries would
displace judicial opinions (for interpretive questions in its domain) and
because, if this Article's above claims are correct, it would lead to clearer
statutes, Chevron for Juries would make legal research cheaper for
everyone. These cost reductions may or may not entirely offset the
increased cost of litigation in a Chevron for Juries framework, but they
do take the wind out of the objection's sail.
B. Jury Incompetence and Bias
Another objection to Chevron for Juries might be couched as a
protest to any expansion of the jury system. An account of juries in the
popular press and, to a lesser extent, the academic legal literature paints
a dismal picture of the institution. Jurors, on this account, are
predisposed toward certain interests (especially plaintiffs in civil cases)
incompetent, and subject to disabling cognitive biases.239 Drawing on
this account, some have proposed taking existing powers away from the
jury.240 Advocates of such proposals would presumably object to
assigning juries new interpretive powers.
This is not the place for an extended review of the empirical
literature on jury behavior. A brief foray into that extensive literature,
however, may dampen the objection. Empirical researchers have, in the
main, failed to confirm the suspicions of jury critics. Leading jury
238 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
239 Robbennolt, supra note 129, at 470 n.3 (collecting sources).
240 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2127 (1998).
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scholars Neil Vidmar and Valerie Hans recently published a book-
length review of empirical work on juries.241 Their ultimate conclusion
was unequivocal: "our verdict is strongly in favor of the American
jury."242
To interrogate the allegation that juries are systematically
predisposed in favor of certain interests (e.g., civil plaintiffs), Vidmar
and Hans looked to studies of agreement rates between juries and the
judges presiding over them.243 The studies revealed "substantial"
agreement between the bench and the jury box, undercutting claims of
jury bias.244 In civil cases, moreover, the studies showed that when
judges and juries disagreed, the disagreements were "evenly balanced,"
confirming that the "alleged bias of juries towards injured plaintiffs
seems not to have existed."245
While jury predisposition can be studied through agreement
analysis, the overall competence of juries may be better assessed through
case studies. Perhaps the most prominent study in this methodological
vein is Richard Lempert's analysis of juries in twelve complex civil
claims, which led him to conclude that "the jury often appears to do
surprisingly well in the face of complexity."246 In a 2005 article, Jennifer
K. Robbennolt reviewed the extant empirical literature comparing judge
and jury decisionmaking.247 Her conclusion bears emphasis:
The most notable conclusion to be drawn from this emerging
literature is that the decisionmaking of judges and jurors is strikingly
similar. While there is evidence of some differences ... they appear
to decide real cases quite similarly, and they show a great deal of
241 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 167.
242 Id. at 346.
243 Id. at 148-51. Modern empirical work on the jury began with such a study. HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
244 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 167, at 149. Some empirical work suggests that judges and
juries differ substantially in damages awards, though this view is contested. Compare, e.g., Reid
Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive
Damages, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1999), with Neil Vidmar, Juries Don't Make Legal Decisions!
And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 705
(1999). This important debate can be bracketed here, as the sort of decisions that Chevron for
Juries would reallocate to juries resemble liability, rather than damages, determinations.
245 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 167, at 149. In criminal cases, by contrast, the studies found
that where judge and jury disagreed, the jury was more likely than the judge to acquit. Id. at 148.
In an intriguing statistical analysis using some of the same data that Vidmar and Hans describe,
statistician Bruce Spencer suggests that while judges may be more "accurate" than juries overall,
in criminal cases juries are less likely than judges to convict an innocent defendant. Bruce D.
Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305 (2007).
246 Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
247 Robbennolt, supra note 129, at 500-02.
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similarity in responding to simulated cases designed to examine a
variety of legal decisionmaking processes.248
The attacks on juries as biased and incompetent thus appear
unsupported by the empirical evidence. But on another front, the jury
critics are surely right. Empirical research reveals that jurors, like
everyone else, suffer cognitive illusions.249 The problem for jury critics is
that empirical research confirms that judges are people too.250 The
empirical reality that judges are not immune from cognitive illusions
further blunts the jury critics' objection.
C. Distributional Consequences
Before concluding, it merits mention that Chevron for Juries has
predictable, albeit likely modest, distributional consequences. Chevron
for Juries would make dispositive motions-i.e., motions that terminate
a case without trial-less likely to be granted. Though this effect is
possible in both criminal and civil matters, it has greater impact in civil
cases, where dispositive motions are a more important part of
practice.251 The effect is marginal, however, as Chevron for Juries would
make successful dispositive motions somewhat less common, not
eliminate them. The likely impact of this effect would be to (1) increase
the number of trials, (2) increase the settlement value of claims, or (3) a
combination of points 1 and 2. In civil cases, at least, Chevron for Juries
248 Id. at 502. To be sure, Robbennolt identified areas where jury performance appears
problematic. Most significantly, for the purposes of this Article, Robbennolt expresses doubt
about the ability of juries to follow legal instructions. Id. at 470. An important new study of actual
jury deliberations suggests that juries may be much more competent in processing and applying
jury instructions than previously thought. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The "Kettleful of Law" in
Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1537 (2012).
249 E.g., Hastie et al., supra note 244.
250 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2001)
("Judges, it seems, are human."). One empirical study comparing cognitive bias in judges and
juries found that while judges do make the sort of cognitive errors predicted by behavioralists, the
errors are less severe than those made by jurors. See W. Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, in
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 186 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002); Reid Hastie &
W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARz. L.
REV. 901 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 26,
36-58 (1999). Guthrie and his coauthors criticize this study on the grounds that it relied on data
about judges gathered through a survey distributed to trial and appellate judges participating in a
law and economics conference. Guthrie et al., supra, at 818 n.201. They note that they "suspect
that the sample of judges in these studies (those who chose to attend a conference on law and
economics) and the context within which the study took place (a law and economics conference)
may have induced somewhat more calculated reasoning processes that dampened the effect." Id.
Richard Lempert offers a similar critique. See Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive
Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 884 (1999).
251 This is largely because there is no criminal law analogue to the civil motion for summary
judgment. See generally Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes: A Proposal for
Defensive Summary Judgment in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 (2011).
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will thus likely have a somewhat pro-plaintiff distributional
consequence. This is not the place to analyze the normative desirability
of a pro-trial or a plaintiff-friendly shift in the law. Suffice it to say,
readers hostile to such shifts may be disinclined towards Chevron for
Juries.
CONCLUSION
I conclude by returning to Chevron itself. Cass Sunstein describes
Chevron as a "counter-Marbury for the administrative state."252 Sunstein's
portrayal of Chevron's importance to statutes administered by agencies is
apt. But as an overall account of Chevron's significance, Sunstein has
understated matters. Chevron is less a case about administrative agencies
than it is about the limits of law and of judges. Its interpretive premises-
that statutes often yield ranges of plausible interpretations and that
nonjudges are sometimes better than judges at making the final
selection-reorient what it means to interpret according to law.
This Article attempted to demonstrate that it is neither necessary
nor desirable to confine that reorientation to statutes that involve
administrative agencies. Chevron's interpretive premises, and the
institutional analysis that follows from them, this Article has argued,
support taking interpretive primacy for at least one more class of
statutes away from judges, this time giving it to juries. If these
arguments have succeeded, Chevron for Juries offers a "better"-i.e.,
more epistemically and politically justified-way to resolve ambiguities
in statutes that govern the conduct of the general public, as well as a
data point in the project of extending Chevron's interpretive insights
beyond administrative law.
252 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2589.
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